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THE RIGHT TO SPEAK, THE RIGHT 
TO HEAR, AND THE RIGHT NOT TO 
HEAR: THE TECHNOLOGICAL 
RESOLUTION TO THE CABLE/ 
PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE 
Michael I. Meyerson* 
Cable television brings many channels of programming into 
the home. Amid this cornucopia, some programs occasionally 
contain nudity or offensive language, "pornography" to those of-
fended. There has been much debate over whether cable pornog-
raphy should be regulated. Not only must policy makers decide 
if regulation is desirable, the courts must determine the appro-
priate legal standard for evaluating the legality and constitution-
ality of such regulation. In July 1986, by a "bare majority," the 
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography voted against 
applying to cable television the same standard used to bar "in-
decent" radio and television broadcasts. 1 Two months after the 
issuance of the Commission's report, a federal judge endorsed, 
for the first time, the argument that "indecent" cable program-
ming could be regulated and limited to nighttime viewing. 2 On 
March 23, 1987, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a deci-
sion striking down a Utah law that barred "indecent" cable pro-
gramming. 3 Because the Court did not issue an opinion, how-
ever, the precise basis for the Court's decision is not clear. 
The new technology of cable television, thus, has resurrected 
an old problem: how should society balance the competing 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Hampshire 
College, 1976; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1979. Support for this Article was pro-
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1. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. FINAL REPORT, 
105 (1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY) (statement of Father Bruce Ritter). 
2. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 992 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J., concurring), 
summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987). Previous lower courts all have found such regu-
lation unconstitutional. See id. aff'g Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. 
Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'g 571 F. 
Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 
(D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982). 
3. Wilkinson v. Jones, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987), aff'g 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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claims of those who wish to avoid exposure to "offensive" mate-
rial in their homes with those who wish to communicate freely or 
to receive the material. The Supreme Court has discussed the 
issue of the right of privacy in the home many times,• but it has 
not yet decided how the privacy interest affects the ability to 
regulate this new form of communication. 
This Article will attempt to create a framework for analyzing 
the competing interests on each side of the cable/pornography 
debate.11 The goal is to construct an analysis that will be consis-
tent with current Supreme Court teaching on how government, 
under the first amendment,6 may constitutionally regulate por-
nography, particularly in the name of protecting those who wish 
to avoid exposure to such material. Accordingly, this Article will 
presume the validity of all relevant Supreme Court decisions 
and their stated rationales.7 Thus, the current restrictive defini-
tion of obscenity8 and broader definition of indecency in broad-
casting9 will be followed. 
This Article will also accept the governmental interests found 
by the Court to support regulation of obscenity and indecency. 
The Supreme Court has held that the overriding societal interest 
in stemming the commercial distribution of obscenity permits 
the government to ban obscene material, even if only willing 
adults have access to it. This interest encompasses: "the interest 
4. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Rowan v. United States 
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86, reh'g denied, 336 U.S. 921 (1949). 
5. The commonly used term "pornography" does not have a specific legal definition. 
This Article uses the term to include material that is either obscene under Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), or indecent, as defined in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 
U.S. 726 (1978). Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (referring to visual 
depiction of sexual conduct by children as "child pornography"). 
6. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
7. See generally Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (stating that the Su-
preme Court's "institutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it now is"). 
8. Under Miller, the three-part test for obscenity is: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
· 9. The Supreme Court defined indecency as "language that describes [or pictures 
that depict], in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the 
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 
(1975)). The Supreme Court held that indecent broadcasts may be barred in the middle 
of the afternoon. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; see infra text accompanying notes 69-96. 
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of the public in the quality of life and the total community envi-
ronment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, 
possibly, the public safety itself."10 
In contrast, the Court has allowed the regulation of indecency 
only to protect unwilling viewers: adults who wish to avoid the 
material and children whose parents want to shield them from 
offensive material.11 This Article will proceed on the Court's as-
sumption that "vulgar" language and depictions of sexual activ-
ity are "'patently offensive' to most people regardless of age.m2 
Even with these assumptions, this Article concludes that the 
power of government to regulate cable pornography is limited to 
that which is legally obscene. Part I reviews Supreme Court 
cases delineating the relationship between the rights of privacy 
in the home and of freedom of speech. Part II demonstrates that 
· the technology of cable television provides the solution to the 
pornography dilemma. Cable television preserves both privacy 
and speech interests because individual subscribers can be given 
the physical means to block out programming they find person-
ally offensive without affecting the ability of others to receive 
that programming. Where such accommodation of interests is 
permissible, the first amendment prohibits censorship as an 
overbroad remedy that needlessly infringes on the rights of 
speakers and willing listeners. 
Part III of the Article analyzes how the cable/pornography de-
bate is affected by the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 
(the Cable Act). 13 The Cable Act, the first comprehensive federal 
legislation governing the regulation of cable television, mandates 
a policy towards cable pornography comparable to that required 
by the first amendment. The Cable Act limits the ability of all 
levels of government to regulate cable programming to the regu-
10. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). 
11. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. 
12. Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, this Article does not provide an analysis 
of the appropriateness of using majoritarian tastes to determine what is offensive. See 
Haiman, Speech u. Privacy: ls There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 
153 (1972). 
Deference is being paid to the sensibilities and privacy claims of the prevalent 
groups in society who happen to find certain kinds of erotic communication or 
certain kinds of words deeply repulsive, while no comparable concern is shown 
for minorities who may have no "hang-ups" about those particular kinds of com-
munication, but who may be just as deeply offended by different verbal and vis-
ual stimuli which few would seriously propose to exclude from a public forum. 
Id. at 191 (emphasis in original). 
13. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C.§§ 521-559 (Supp. III 
1985) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.). Sections of the 
Cable Act will be referred to by their original numbering throughout the Article. 
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lation or banning of obscene cable programming, but also re-
quires cable operators to provide devices to their subscribers 
that can block out programming. 
Finally, the article explores the special congressional protec-
tion for access channels-channels set aside as a public forum 
for the use of all members of a community or for mandatory 
leasing to programmers who are not affiliated with the cable op-
erator. On these channels, the Cable Act prohibits censorship 
not only by the government, but by the cable operator and even 
the entity managing the public access channels. In sum, both the 
first amendment and the Cable Act permit cable television to 
advance the public's interest in receiving "the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources. "14 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVACY OF THE HOME 
Within the context of the home, the first amendment guaran-
tee of freedom of speech has taken on an anomalous shape. In 
some instances, the Supreme Court has found the protection of 
free expression at its strongest in the home, barring regulation 
that would be permitted elsewhere.111 At other times, the Court 
has permitted constitutionally protected expression to be re-
stricted or prohibited altogether, precisely because of the in-
volvement of the home.16 
The issue in all these decisions has been the determination of 
the effect "the unique privacy interests of persons residing in 
their homes"17 has on the fundamental principles of the first 
amendment. These privacy interests can encompass a desire ei-
ther to receive or to avoid particular speech in the sanctity of 
one's home. The two types of privacy interests create quite dif-
ferent issues because the interest in receiving information coin-
cides with the free speech interests of the speaker, although that 
of avoiding speech presents a direct conflict with the speaker's 
14. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
15. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (overturning conviction for pri-
vate possession of obscene material in the home); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 56 U.S.L.W. 
4785, 4788 (U.S. June 28, 1988) (No. 87-168) (stating that "in many locations, we expect 
individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear," but "individuals are not 
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes"). 
16. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (upholding restriction 
on "indecent" broadcasting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (plurality opinion) 
(upholding ban on sound trucks in residential areas). 
17. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 638 (1980). 
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interests. When the interests coincide, the result could be 
termed "super-first amendment" protection that overpowers 
otherwise valid state interests.18 Sometimes, though, a person 
seeks refuge in the home from the speech of others. In explain-
ing the "householder's right to be left alone,m9 the Court has 
noted, "Great as is the value of exposing citizens to novel views, 
home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself 
up in his own ideas if he desires. "20 
As the Supreme Court has stated, conflicts between speakers 
and unwilling listeners "demand delicate balancing because: 'In 
th[e] sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of 
[free speech or] free press, the interests on both sides are plainly 
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our soci-
ety.' "21 In fact, when the privacy interest involves avoiding un-
pleasant or undesirable speech, the balance becomes even more 
delicate than this quote would indicate. The complexity in-
creases because there are usually three, rather than two, inter-
ests involved. Not only does one party seek to speak and a sec-
ond wish to avoid that speech, generally a third party also wants 
to receive the message in question.22 Thus, a speaker who desires 
to address a wide audience may only be silenced if the listeners 
include a "captive audience" that cannot escape the speech.23 
The nature of the audience differs with the method of commu-
nication used. Different media intrude in different ways into the 
home and present different degrees of difficulty for a person de-
sirous of avoiding the messages they contain. Therefore, courts 
have devised different standards to govern the varied forms of 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 27-34. 
19. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976). 
20. Id. (quoting z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1954)); see also 
Frisby v. Schultz, 56 U.S.L.W. 4785, 4788 (U.S. June 28, 1988) (No. 87-168) ("There is 
simply no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener."). 
21. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975) (quoting Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)). In quoting from Cox Broadcast-
ing, the Erznoznik decision did more than merely add the bracketed reference to "free 
speech"; it changed the meaning of the word "privacy." The earlier case, dealing with 
publication of a rape victim's name, had involved the publication of private facts. Cox 
Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 492. See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 
4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890) (discussing the desirability of protection from unwanted 
press coverage of personal information). By contrast, Erznoznik dealt with shielding on-
lookers from nudity displayed at drive-in movie theaters. Although the quote is still ap-
propriate, it alters the context of privacy from freedom from unwanted publicity, Cox 
Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 489, to protection against "unwilling exposure to materials 
that may be offensive." Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208. 
22. See generally Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. 
REV. 233, 264-65. 
23. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980). 
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communication, so as to maintain the balance between the com-
peting interests.2• 
A. The Basic Framework: Stanley and Kovacs 
The protection of the right of individuals in their own homes 
to receive or avoid messages is best illustrated by two seemingly 
disparate first amendment cases that focus on rights of the lis-
tener, not the speaker. In Stanley v. Georgia,25 the home created 
an impenetrable wall, keeping government away from the pri-
vate enjoyment of even legally obscene films. In Kovacs v. 
Cooper,28 the Court permitted the government to create a regu-
latory wall that kept otherwise constitutionally protected speech 
out of the home because it came from a loudspeaker. 
In Stanley, the Court overturned the conviction for "posses-
sion of obscene matter" of a man who had kept three reels of 
eight millimeter film in a desk drawer in his upstairs bedroom. 27 
The Court stated that if the films were obscene, they would not 
be protected by the first amendment.28 Nonetheless, although 
the films and, therefore, presumably the filmmaker, remained 
outside the Constitution's free speech umbrella and subject to 
governmental regulation, the recipient of the message-the film 
watcher-had an independent constitutional right: "the right to 
read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellec-
tual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home."29 
Essentially a constitutional "alloy," this right combined the 
first amendment right to receive information30 with the fourth 
amendment's guarantee of freedom from "unwanted governmen-
tal intrusions into one's privacy."31 Just as steel is stronger than 
24. "Each method of communicating ideas is a 'law unto itself' and that law must 
reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses, and dangers' of each method." Metromedia, 
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
25. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
26. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
27. 394 U.S. at 558. The police were searching the house for evidence of bookmaking 
activities. They apparently found no evidence of wrongdoing other than the film. 
28. Id. at 560 (applying Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957)); accord 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
29. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
30. Id. at 564; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). 
31. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). The Court relied on Justice Bran-
deis's statement about the rationale behind the fourth amendment: "The makers of our 
Constitution ... conferred ... the right to be left alone-the most comprehensive of 
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its component elements of iron and carbon, this compound con-
stitutional right outweighed governmental interests that justified 
regulation when only the first amendment was involved. 82 
The Supreme Court has held that government may ban ob-
scene material to safeguard broad societal interests such as "the 
quality of life and the total community environment" and "the 
public safety itself."88 Yet the Court has found these interests 
insufficient to permit a state to criminalize private possession of 
obscenity in the home: 
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes reg-
ulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the 
privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment 
means anything, it means that a State has no business 
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books 
he may read or films he may watch. 34 
rights and the right most valued by civilized man." Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
32. The Court explored the first amendment's impact on the fourth amendment's 
guarantee against unreasonable searches in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 
(1978), holding that the first amendment did not totally prohibit the use of search war-
rants to obtain information from newspaper offices. The Court stressed that the fact that 
a newspaper, and not some other commercial establishment, was the subject of the war-
rant would affect the determination of the "reasonableness" of the search. 
Where the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amend-
ment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with 
"scrupulous exactitude." "A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one 
setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another 
kind of material." 
Id. at 564 (citations omitted); see also id. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring) ("While there is 
no justification for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment procedure for the 
press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant for the search of press offices can and should 
take cognizance of the independent values protected by the First Amendment .... "). 
33. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973); see supra text accompa-
nying note 10. 
34. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. The Supreme Court has held that Stanley is not con-
trolling in a case involving only speech or only privacy interests. Rather than treating 
Stanley as involving the combination of speech and privacy interest, the Court has 
somewhat inconsistently argued that Stanley rested only on whichever interest was not 
in the particular case before it. For example, in holding that the right to possess obscene 
material in one's home does not give a corollary right to purchase or import obscene 
material or to transport it in interstate commerce, the Court stated that Stanley "re-
flects no more than ... the law's 'solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within 
[the home].'" United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973) (quoting 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also Paris Adult 
Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 66 (Stanley was "hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's 
home is his castle.'"). On the other hand, in rejecting an argument that Georgia's sod-
omy statute violated the right of privacy, the Court stated that Stanley was not a case 
about privacy in the home but "was firmly grounded in the First Amendment." Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986). 
144 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:1 & 2 
In contrast, although the State has no interest that would jus-
tify regulating the private consumption of books and films, the 
Supreme Court in Kovacs held that a municipality could ban 
sound trucks in order to preserve a residential neighborhood's 
peace and quiet. BG The governmental concern in Kovacs focused 
on the home dweller who wanted to avoid the speech from the 
sound truck but could not shut out the noise: "[The unwilling 
listener] is practically helpless to escape this interference with 
his privacy by loud speakers except through the protection of 
the municipality."36 
In Kovacs, the Court acknowledged that speakers have a first 
amendment right not only to speak, but also to attempt to locate 
those who wish to receive their messages.37 The Court con-
cluded, however, that the interest in protecting people in their 
homes from receiving speech they wished to avoid outweighed 
this first amendment right. It did not matter to the Court that 
not every person in the community wanted to keep out the in-
formation provided by the sound trucks or that some might ac-
tually wish to receive the information being offered. 38 The Court 
found it enough that "some" in the community might find the 
noise objectionable. 39 
The basic framework constructed by the Supreme Court in 
Stanley and Kovacs thus gives a person at home both the abso-
lute constitutional right to read books or watch movies and the 
right, protectable by government, to avoid exposure to undesired 
speech. The permissible role of government when these rights 
collide presents the next question. 
B. The I deal Balance: The Post Office Cases 
The postal system represents the only form of mass communi-
cation entering the home that has been available ever since the 
35. 336 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion). 
36. Id. at 86-87. 
37. Justice Reed stated, "The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he 
may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win 
their attention." Id. at 87. 
38. Although no Justice voting to uphold the ordinance discussed the "willing lis-
tener," it can be presumed that loudspeakers would not have been widely used or consid-
ered "essential to the sound thinking of a fully informed citizenry," id. at 102 (Black, J., 
dissenting), if some home residents did not receive and consider the messages being 
offered. 
39. Id. at 81. 
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drafting of the Constitution.'0 After a long journey, the Supreme 
Court has finally reached a balance for the regulation of the pos-
tal system that protects the rights of speakers and the twin 
rights of home dwellers to see and not to see. 
At first, the Court granted the Postal Service broad powers to 
regulate the content of the mail it carried.41 Because other, al-
beit less efficient, means always existed to convey one's written 
messages, the Court granted the government great latitude in 
determining what messages to classify as unmailable: "The legis-
lative body in thus establishing a postal service may annex such 
conditions to it as it chooses. "'2 
Oliver Wendell Holmes attacked this permissive interpreta-
tion in a notable dissent. According to Justice Holmes, "The 
United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but 
while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a 
part of free speech as the right to use our tongues. "'3 In 1965, 
the Court agreed. Lamont v. Postmaster General" struck down 
as violative of the right of free speech a federal law requiring 
that an addressee make a request in writing before the Post Of-
fice would deliver "communist political propaganda."n Signifi-
cantly, the Court based its decision not on the right to distribute 
the publications, but on the rights of those who wished to re-
ceive them.48 For instance, in his concurring opinion, Justice 
Brennan declared the right to receive publications to be a funda-
mental right, stating that "[t]he dissemination of ideas can ac-
complish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to 
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To establish 
Post Offices and post roads .... "). 
41. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
42. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497,506 (1904); see also Ex Parte Jack-
son, 96 U.S. at 736 (upholding the power of Congress to bar obscene, indecent, and im-
moral material from the mails, so that the mail "not be used to transport such cor-
rupting publications and articles"). See I. PooL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 86-87 (1983) 
for a list of some of the materials that have, at one time or another, been declared un-
mailable. (The list includes liquor ads when liquor was illegal; solicitations appearing to 
be bills; unsolicited ads for contraceptives; prize fight films; fraudulent matter; lotteries; 
obscene matter; sexually oriented ads; pandering ads; securities offerings other than by 
an approved prospectus; matters inciting arson, murder, or assassination; and material 
obstructing conscription.) 
43. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 
255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). This sentence has been quoted approv-
ingly in a number of cases, including Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); 
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971); and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60, 70 n.18 (1983). 
44. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
45. Id. at 307. 
46. Id. 
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receive and consider them."·" He added, "It would be a barren 
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."48 
Although the problem of protecting "unwilling addressees" 
from offensive mail was merely a side issue in Lamont,49 the 
Court directly confronted the question in Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp.Go Bolger involved a challenge to a ban on the 
mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. The 
government attempted to justify its prohibition as necessary for 
shielding home dwellers and their children from potentially of-
fensive materials.u The Court dismissed this concern about of-
fensiveness as one that "carries little weight."u The Court held 
that suppression of speech is not justified merely because some 
may find it offensive.Gs Even though it acknowledged the privacy 
interest in the home, the Court stated that recipients of objec-
tionable mailings do not constitute a "captive" audience; unlike 
the home dwellers in Kovacs, the recipients can "effectively 
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by 
averting their eyes. "G4 
The Court also refused to consider children as a captive audi-
ence needing special governmental protection because of the 
ease with which parents can police a mailbox. r,r, Moreover, 
whatever "marginal degree of protection" the ban provided in 
helping parents control how their children learned about "sensi-
tive" subjects like birth control,r,e it was deemed insubstantial as 
compared to the harm resulting from keeping the material away 
from adults: "The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply 
47. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 310 (Brennan, J., concurring). The majority opinion did not address 
this issue at all. 
50. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
51. Id. at 71. 
52. Id. As Justice Stevens pointed out, the "offensiveness" in this case involved the 
ideas expressed in the contraceptives advertisement, not the style or manner of expres-
sion. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, the ban was essentially a constitutionally 
suspect viewpoint-based restriction. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 12-2, at 581 (1978) (stating that governmental action aimed at the communicative 
impact of speech "is presumptively at odds with the first amendment"). 
53. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71; accord Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 701 
(1977). 
54. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)). 
55. The Court distinguished offensive mailings from similarly offensive radio broad-
casts by stating: "The receipt of mail is far less intrusive and uncontrollable." Id. at 74. 
See infra text accompanying notes 69-95, for discussion of regulation of broadcasting. 
56. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73. 
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cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a 
sandbox. "67 
In Bolger, the Supreme Court thus found that the right of a 
speaker to communicate through the mails outweighed a recipi-
ent's interest in preventing entry into the home of objectionable 
material. 68 Although the Court in Lamont had held that requir-
ing a recipient to request material unconstitutionally burdened 
the right to receive information, the Bolger Court stated that the 
"short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... 
is an acceptable burden" on the right to avoid offensive mate-
rial.69 This burden is only acceptable, however, when the com-
bined rights of a speaker to send the material and of a willing 
home dweller to receive it balance against the rights of an un-
willing recipient. When the willing recipient does not appear in 
the equation, the balance shifts in favor of the right to limit the 
material that enters one's home. 
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,60 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting a mailer 
from sending further advertisements to people who had previ-
ously notified the Post Office that they considered that mailer's 
advertisements to be "erotically arousing or sexually provoca-
tive. "61 The Court stressed that the law did not allow the gov-
ernment to determine what mailings were objectionable but left 
this determination entirely to each individual's "complete and 
unfettered discretion"; thus, the law preserved individual auton-
omy by permitting home dwellers to exclude mail they found of-
fensive from their mailbox.62 In upholding the ban, the Court 
refused to impose a burden on the citizen to "determin[e] on 
repeated occasions whether the offending mailer has altered its 
material so as to make it acceptable."63 Thus, the Court held 
that the "[regular] journey from mail box to trash can," which it 
found sufficient for protecting individuals from "offensive" unso-
licited contraceptive advertisements, constituted an unaccept-
57. Id. at 74. 
58. See id. at 78 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("(I]ndividuals are able to avoid the in-
formation in Youngs' advertisements after one exposure" by having their names removed 
from the mailing list). 
59. Id. at 72 (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 
883 (S.D.N.Y.), summarily aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 
(1968)). . 
60. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
61. 39 U.S.C. § 3008(a) (1982). 
62. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 734, 736. 
63. Id. at 738. 
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able burden on the "very basic right to be free from [unwanted] 
sights, sounds, and tangible matter" in Rowan. 64 
Though the Court has not explained the distinction between 
Bolger and Rowan, the fundamental difference between the two 
cases appears to be that, in Rowan, the government's protection 
of the right of another not to see did not deny any "willing lis-
tener" the right to receive information. The statutory scheme 
found constitutional in Rowan permitted those who wanted to 
avoid certain speech to do so without infringing on the ability of 
others to receive it. Even if some speakers may have been frus-
trated by their inability to convert "unwilling" listeners, the 
statute created a narrow and justifiable limitation on the right of 
free speech. 
According to then Associate Justice Rehnquist, "First Amend-
ment freedoms would be of little value if speakers had to obtain 
permission of their audiences before advancing particular view-
points. "66 Such a requirement obviously would injure both 
speakers and willing, even arguably non-objecting, listeners. 
When the unwilling listener can be isolated, however, the "an-
cient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not 
even the king may enter' "66 prevails over the right of a speaker 
to try to attract that listener's attention. There is simply no con-
stitutional right to send unwanted material into the home: "[A] 
mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an 
unreceptive addressee."67 
In the postal cases, the Court has reached as close to an ideal 
solution as can be achieved in a complex world of competing in-
terests and differing tastes. First, the government is kept out of 
the business of deciding what material is offensive.68 Second, the 
right to see and the right not to see are protected. Home dwell-
ers are given the right to keep material they have found to be 
offensive out of their homes, but this protection will be provided 
in such a way as to leave unimpaired the rights of those who 
wish to receive those same publications. This scheme does not 
provide complete protection for the sensitive because they must 
64. Id. at 736. 
65. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring). 
66. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). 
67. Id. at 736-37; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 56 U.S.L.W. 4785, 4788 (U.S. June 28, 
1988) (No. 87-168). 
68. Legally obscene material, however, can still be barred from the mails, even if sent 
to a willing recipient. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). For a history of the 
ban on mailing obscene publications, see Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 500-18 
(1962) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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endure an initial exposure to an offensive advertisement before 
receiving protection. Nonetheless, a significant difference exists 
between a one-time exposure to and continual confrontation 
with such material. Furthermore, considering the competing 
speech interests at stake in the balance, the Rowan solution 
seems to represent a workable compromise. 
Unfortunately, not all forms of communication lend them-
selves as readily to this sort of accommodation of interests. Elec-
tronic communications present an especially difficult combina-
tion of interests to balance and one that advances in technology 
continually alter. 
C. Broadcasting: The Pig in the Parlor 
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 69 the Supreme Court faced the 
question of the Federal Communications Commission's power to 
protect radio listeners who wished to keep indecent, though not 
legally obscene, broadcasts out of their homes and away from 
their unsupervised children.70 At two o'clock on a Tuesday after-
noon, a New York City radio station played a recorded mono-
logue by a "satiric humorist," George Carlin, describing repeat-
edly, explicitly, and presciently "the words you couldn't say on 
the public ... airwaves."71 The FCC did not impose any pen-
alty on the station, but issued a warning that it would consider 
sanctions against the station if future indecent broadcasts oc-
curred. The radio station appealed the warning issuance. 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of barring 
constitutionally protected, though indecent, language from the 
airwaves in the middle of the afternoon.72 Unlike prior broad-
69. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
70. Ironically, the sole person to complain about the program at issue heard the 
broadcast while driving in his car. His child, rather than listening without parental su-
pervision, sat next to him. Id. at 730. Nonetheless, both the FCC and the Court appar-
ently acted on the assumption that the complaining parent spoke for those in the more 
vulnerable position at home. 
71. Id. at 729. Justice Powell described the recording as "a sort of verbal shock treat-
ment." Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). 
72. The Court stressed that the FCC order did not completely ban all indecent 
speech, or even the Carlin monologue, from the airwaves. Id. at 750. The FCC criticized 
the station for broadcasting the monologue "at a time when children were undoubtedly 
in the audience (i.e., in the early afternoon)." Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975). 
In a second opinion, the FCC emphasized that it had not established "an absolute prohi-
bition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to times 
of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it." Pacifica Found., 59 
F.C.C.2d 892, 892 (1976) (petition for clarification or reconsideration). Thus, Justice 
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casting cases, however, the Court did not base its holding on the 
scarcity of airwaves and the subsequent need for government to 
regulate broadcast licensees in the public interest. 73 Rather, the 
Court relied on the need to preserve the home as a sanctuary, 
safe from unwanted sounds. The Court emphasized this concern 
in its famous paraphrase of the zoning rationale that permits the 
isolation of an activity considered to constitute a nuisance: 
"[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, 
the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof 
that the pig is obscene."74 The Court thus characterized broad-
casting as posing a "unique" threat to the peace of the parlor 
because of its "uniquely pervasive presence" and unique accessi-
bility to children.711 
Although it may appear somewhat contradictory to use analo-
gies in discussing a "unique" form of communication, the Court 
compared the broadcast audience to the Kovacs home dweller 
who was unable to avoid a loudspeaker, rather than to a mail 
recipient who could effortlessly discard unwanted advertise-
ments.76 The Court treated the radio listener as a member of a 
captive audience in need of governmental protection: because 
the audience frequently tunes in at the middle of a program, 
prior warnings cannot provide complete protection.77 
Powell wrote that the Commission order being reviewed did not prohibit "broadcasting 
the monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are likely to be in the 
audience." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring). The FCC has recently de-
cided, however, that even the hours between 10:00 p.m. and midnight might not be ap-
propriate for such programming because, at least on weekends, a significant number of 
children are still in the broadcast audience. Pacifica Found., FCC 87-138, para. 16 
(adopted Apr. 16, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedcom Library, FCC file). 
73. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969); NBC v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). The FCC made the argument that spectrum 
scarcity justified the ban on indecent speech both in its order, Pacifica Found., 56 
F.C.C.2d at 97, and in its brief to the Supreme Court, Brief for the Federal Communica-
tions Commission at 37-40, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528). 
The Supreme Court did not even address the relevance of the issue. Yet as Justice Bren-
nan argued, "although scarcity has justified increasing the diversity of speakers and 
speech, it has never been held to justify censorship." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 770 n.4 (quot-
ing Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J.) (striking down 
FCC action) (emphasis in original)). 
74. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750-51. The original quote was "nuisance may be merely a 
right thing in the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
75. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. 
76. See supra notes 53-54. 
77. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. In discussing the holding of Pacifica, the Court has 
since said that "the medium's uniquely pervasive presence renders impossible any prior 
warning for those listeners who may be offended by indecent language." FCC v. League 
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 n.13 (1984). Indeed, immediately prior to the broad-
cast of the Carlin monologue, the radio station had given a warning that the recording 
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In his dissent, Justice Brennan rejected any characterization 
of the radio listener as "captive" because "an individual volunta-
rily chooses to admit radio communication into his home" and 
could, therefore, prevent offensive speech from entering by sim-
ply removing the radio.78 The majority did not answer this argu-
ment directly but seemed to find unrealistic the solution of tell-
ing listeners to evict their radios to avoid offensive 
programming. The Court described radio as "a uniquely perva-
sive presence in the lives of all Americans."79 With 98.6% of all 
Americans owning radios and 97% owning televisions,80 the 
Court chose to treat the entry of radio and television broadcast-
ing into the home as universal and inevitable. Once radio pro-
grams were viewed as invitees into the American home, it was a 
small step for the Court to require that programmers behave 
like invited guests.81 
Once a guest in the home, broadcasting can have an enormous 
impact on the parental and societal interest in protecting the 
welfare of children. The Court found the Carlin monologue, 
which "could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant,"82 
particularly offensive because of the likely presence of un-
supervised children in the audience. The Court regarded broad-
casting as different from other forms of communication because 
of the ease with which children can receive broadcast program-
ming.83 Moreover, because broadcasting is available to any child 
with access to a radio or television, it differs from other forms of 
communication, such as books and movies, that "may be with-
held from the young without restricting the expression at its 
source. "84 
The Court rejected an argument, similar to one later accepted 
in Bolger, that a ban of offensive material is unnecessary be-
cause offended home dwellers could avoid further offense by 
averting their eyes. 86 According to the Court, applying such a 
concept to broadcasting "is like saying that the remedy for an 
contained "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." Pacifica, 
438 U.S. at 730 (quoting Pacifica's response to the initial complaint). 
78. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 764-66 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. at 748 (emphasis added). 
80. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 542 (1985) (figures for utilization of media in 1975). 
81. Justice Powell referred to the "right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offen-
sive sights and sounds." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring). 
82. Id. at 749. 
83. Id. at 750. 
84. Id. at 749. 
85. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983). 
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assault is to run away after the first blow.''86 This right to avoid 
"the first blow" closely resembles the interest announced in 
Rowan of avoiding the imposition on home dwellers of "the bur-
den of determining" the acceptability of each piece of mail. 87 
That interest superseded speech interests in the postal cases, 
but only when protection of that interest did not deny a willing 
third party the right to receive information.88 In Pacifica, how-
ever, the Court discounted the countervailing interest of home 
dwellers who wanted to listen to the "offensive" broadcast on 
the theory that they could easily receive the identical message 
through tapes, records, nightclubs, and, perhaps, late night 
broadcasts.89 As Justices Powell and Blackmun, who supplied 
the critical fourth and fifth votes for the majority, stated in their 
concurrence, "I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any 
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's own 
words from doing so. "90 
This analysis underestimates the "willing" listener's interest 
in having access to uncensored broadcasts. The Court ignores 
the benefit to listeners of receiving programming at a convenient 
time at no charge through their radios, when the only alterna-
tives require spending money for records or nightclubs.91 Addi-
tionally, the Court misidentifies the speaker: by tuning the dial 
to a particular station, the listener has indicated a desire to hear 
the speech of the broadcaster, who may well use other persons' 
taped messages to communicate the station's message. Thus, a 
limitation on a broadcaster's speech restricts desired communi-
cation between a willing speaker-the broadcaster-and a will-
ing listener, to protect the unwilling listener. 
86. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978). 
87. Id. at 749; Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). 
88. In fact, the Pacifica Court cites Rowan for the proposition that "in the privacy of 
the home ... the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amend-
ment rights of an intruder." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. This equation omits reference to 
the impairment of the right of those who wish to receive information. 
89. 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring). 
90. Id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring). The concurrence acknowledged that the argu-
ment that the FCC ruling "prevents willing adults from listening to Carlin's monologue 
over the radio in the early afternoon hours ... [and] will have the effect of 'reduc[ing] 
the adult population ... to [hearing] only what is fit for children' ... is not without 
force." Id. at 760 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). Nonetheless, 
Justice Powell concluded that the interest was "not sufficiently strong" to overturn the 
ruling. Id. 
91. As Justice Brennan stated, "The opinions ... display ... a sad insensitivity to 
the fact that these alternatives involve the expenditure of money, time, and effort that 
many of those wishing to hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to afford .... " Id. 
at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Generally, the government may not silence a speaker to pro-
tect the squeamish. 92 The government inay not shield the un-
willing viewer at the expense of the willing viewer if both view-
ers may be accommodated. Silencing speech is only permitted 
when "substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an es-
sentially intolerable manner."93 Thus, the result in Pacifica can 
be justified only upon a finding that no alternative means exist 
to protect unwilling listeners from the offensive speech in their 
homes.94 Once a court rejects both the listener's options of re-
moving the radio from the home altogether and of changing the 
channel after hearing offensive speech, there is indeed no way 
the broadcast audience can avoid offensive programming "with-
out restricting the expression at its source."911 
Government cannot protect the right to avoid unwanted 
broadcast messages without simultaneously restricting the right 
to speak and the right to receive information in the home.96 
When a speaker transmits the message via the mails rather than 
the airwaves, however, the unwilling recipient can be protected 
separately; thus, an accommodation of competing rights is re-
quired. To determine whether indecent material can be barred 
from cable television, it is therefore necessary to examine the 
physical characteristics of that medium to determine whether 
the right to avoid such material can be protected in such a way 
as to avoid limiting the first amendment rights of others. 
II. CABLE TELEVISION AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE TECHNOLOGICAL 
SOLUTION 
Although the pictures from both broadcast television stations 
and cable systems appear on the same home television screen, 
the technologies of the two media differ significantly. Broadcast 
signals travel through the airwaves, sharing the limited radio 
spectrum, and all who own radios and television sets may receive 
92. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
93. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21; see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980) (adopting the Cohen analysis). 
94. "Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment 
does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audi-
ence cannot avoid objectionable speech." Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 541-42. 
95. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. 
96. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 n.13 (1984). 
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these signals.87 In contrast, a cable system carries its signals 
through enclosed wires made of either a metal coaxial cable or a 
thin glass pipe known as optical fiber, and these signals only 
enter the homes of subscribers.88 
As a result of the technological differences between cable and 
broadcast television, a cable system can provide far more chan-
nels, and thus much more programming, than that offered by a 
broadcaster.88 Cable systems currently carry thirty-six, fifty-four 
or even one hundred channels: "an electronic medium of com-
munications more diverse, more pluralistic, and more open, 
more like the print and film media than our present broadcast 
system.moo Although this cornucopia obviously advances the 
97. See generally NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-13 (1943) (describing the 
chaotic proliferation of radio stations prior to federal regulation of airwaves). Some have 
argued that the FCC's division of the radio spectrum has actually increased the scarcity 
of signals by limiting the number of stations available. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 547 (2d ed. 1977) ("The scarcity of television channels differs from the scarcity of 
other natural resources only in the fact that it is to a significant extent the product of 
deliberate governmental policies!"); see also Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry 
of Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communication Commission's Spec-
trum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 988-91 (1981). 
98. For an excellent discussion of the technology of a cable system, see S. WEINSTEIN, 
GETMNG THE PICTURE 17-40 (1986). 
The cable system gathers signals from local and distant broadcast stations, satellites, 
and directly from local programming studios at the cable "headend," where the signals 
are each assigned a frequency and sent through the cable system. The cables that pass 
through the community are either laid underground or hung from utility poles. 
The capital costs of constructing a cable system are quite high, with aerial construc-
tion costing between $7500 and $15,000 a mile and underground construction costing as 
much as $100,000 a mile. Id. at 17; see also Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. 
Supp. 976, 986 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985) (estimating a 
cost of $7,000,000 to wire Newport County, Rhode Island). Accordingly, three federal 
appellate courts have termed cable television a "natural monopoly." Central Telecommu-
nications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. 
Ct. 1358 (1987); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 
(7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 n.8 (1974) (describing electric company as a natural mo-
nopoly "created by the economic forces of high threshold capital requirements and virtu-
ally unlimited economy of scale"). 
99. "Unlike ordinary broadcast television, which transmits the video image over air-
waves capable of bearing only a limited number of signals, cable reaches the home over a 
coaxial cable with the technological capacity to carry 200 channels or more." Quincy 
Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 
(1986). 
100. CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15 
(1974); see also H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS 4655, 4658-59 (legislative history of the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-
559 (Supp. III 1985) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.)) 
(describing cable systems with as many as 108 channels). Currently, 37.2% of all cable 
systems have a channel capacity of 35 to 53 channels and 6.6% have a capacity of 54 
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first amendment interest in the diversity of programming, 101 it 
also creates some delicate problems. Cable programs generally 
are not sufficiently explicit to be considered legally obscene, yet 
they are often substantially more sexually explicit than anything 
on broadcast television.102 Such programming may contain 
nudity, depictions of sexual activity, and sexually explicit or pro-
fane language.103 Much of this type of programming would un-
doubtedly be classified as "indecent" and;thus, barred from the 
broadcast media. 10• 
The availability of such indecent programming on the home 
screen for the first time has led to calls for regulation and cen-
sorship of indecency on cable. 105 For such regulation to be valid, 
however, it must be permissible under both the federal Cable 
Act and the Constitution. Because the statutory scheme explic-
itly depends on the resolution of the constitutional issue, 106 the 
constitutional analysis will precede the discussion of the legisla-
tive framework. 
A. The Constitutional Balance: The Required 
Accommodation of Interests 
Thus far, every court to consider the constitutionality of laws 
barring indecent programming from cable television has found 
the laws unconstitutional.107 Whatever the validity of the lower 
courts' ultimate holding, their underlying legal analysis has 
channels or more. Cable System Channel Usage, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 22, 1986, at 
45. 
101. See Central Telecommunications, Inc., 800 F.2d at 717. 
102. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 282-83. 
103. Id. at 1421. See generally Waters & Gelman, Cable's Blues in the Night, NEWS-
WEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 48. 
104. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 726-41 (1978); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). 
105. Both the City of Miami and the State of Utah have enacted laws restricting 
indecent cable fare. See Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'g Commu-
nity Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985), summarily aff'd, 
107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'g 571 F. Supp. 
125 (S.D. Fla. 1983). Additionally, the organization, Morality in Media, has proposed a 
"model cable indecency statute." Krattenmaker & Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable 
Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 606, 610 
(1983). 
106. For example, rather than ban obscene and indecent programming from cable, 
Congress prohibited the transmission of programming that was "obscene or otherwise 
unprotected by the Constitution of the United States .... " Cable Act § 639, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 559 (Supp. III 1985); see infra text accompanying notes 197-225. 
107. See Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), summarily aff'd, 107 S. 
Ct. 1559 (1987); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Community Television, 
Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 
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failed to incorporate the Supreme Court's teaching on the rela-
tionship between the form of communication used to transmit 
"offensive" messages and the scope of a government's power to 
protect a home dweller's right to avoid that message. 
In Wilkinson v. Jones, 108 the Supreme Court summarily af-
firmed a lower court's decision striking down Utah's cable inde-
cency law. Although a summary a.ffirmance constitutes the 
Court's holding as to the merits of a case,109 the Court has cau-
ticmed that such an affirmance has "considerably less preceden-
tial value" than an opinion on the merits.U0 Most importantly, a 
summary affirmance does not affirm the rationale behind a judg-
ment, only the judgment itself.111 Thus, especially when there is 
more than one rationale for a holding, it is impossible to tell the 
reasoning endorsed by the Court. 
The lower court in Wilkinson112 found several defects in the 
indecency law. The court stated that the state law was pre-
empted by the federal Cable Act, 113 unconstitutionally vague, 114 
and overbroad because it regulated cable programming that was 
not obscene under the test set out in Miller v. California. 1111 The 
briefs filed with the Supreme Court reflected the variety of 
grounds on which the lower courts relied. 116 Because the lower 
court's opinion rested on both the nonconstitutional ground of 
indecency and the previously established vagueness rationale, 
531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982). But see Jones, 800 F.2d at 992 (Baldock, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that cable indecency can be regulated, but not prohibited). 
108. 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987), aff'g 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'g Community 
Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985). 
109. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). 
110. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-81 
(1979). 
111. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). 
112. The Tenth Circuit did not add to the district court's analysis but "affirmed its 
judgment on the basis of the reasons stated in the opinion." Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 
989, 991 (10th Cir 1986), summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987). Hence, reference to the 
"lower court" in that case means the opinion of the District Court. 
113. Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Utah 
1985); see infra text accompanying notes 226-41. 
114. Community Television, 611 F. Supp. at 1117 (stating that defining indecent pro-
gramming by its "time, place, manner, and context" failed to describe with "narrow 
specificity" which programs were prohibited). 
115. Id. at 1106-15 (relying on Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
116. The Jurisdictional Statement for the State of Utah posed the question of the 
law's validity in the broadest possible way: whether the first amendment denies govern-
ment "any power" to restrict cable indecency "in any circumstances," Jurisdictional 
Statement at i, Wilkinson v. Jones, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987) (No. 86-1125). In contrast, the 
Motion to Affirm listed three rationales for striking down the law: vagueness, an uncon-
stitutional restriction on protected speech, and preemption by the Cable Act. Motion to 
Affirm at i. 
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the Supreme Court's affirmance cannot be relied upon as a 
groundbreaking precedent holding all regulation of cable inde-
cency unconstitutional. 117 
In addition to not announcing a standard for the regulation of 
cable television content, the Supreme Court has thus far failed 
to establish a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of 
any cable television regulation. In the only case in which the 
Court has issued an opinion, City of Los Angeles u. Preferred 
Communications, Inc., 118 the Court merely ruled that the con-
struction and operation of a cable system "plainly implicate 
First Amendment interests. "119 Of course, as the Court itself ac-
knowledged, this characterization "does not end the inquiry. 
'Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places 
and at all times.' "120 The Court declined to decide whether Los 
Angeles had, as alleged, violated Preferred Communications' 
first amendment rights by refusing to grant it a cable television 
franchise. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the district 
court to resolve the underlying factual disputes between the 
parties. 121 
The Court also declined to announce the legal standard for 
evaluating first amendment challenges to cable franchising. 122 In 
comparing cable to other forms of communication with well es-
tablished first amendment standards, m the Court stated that 
117. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S, 173, 176 (1977) (stating that a summary affirm-
ance "should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles es-
tablished by prior decisions to the particular facts involved"); see also id. at 180 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (stating that judges must determine whether a summary disposition 
does "not even arguably [rest] upon some alternative nonconstitutional ground"). Be-
cause the District Court specifically found that the Utah law acted as a total ban on 
indecent programming and "does not channel indecency to specific viewing hours," Com-
munity Television, 611 F. Supp. at 1114-15, neither the Tenth Circuit's nor the $upreme 
Court's affirmance resolves the constitutionality of a statute that restricted indecency to 
late night hours. See infra discussion accompanying notes 176-88. 
118. 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
119. Id. at 494. 
120. Id. at 495 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 
U.S. 788, 799 (1985)); see, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 561 
(1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[T)o say the ordinance presents a First Amendment 
issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation.") (empha-
sis in original); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) ("Recognition that First 
Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive of our inquiry here."). 
121. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 496. The major factual disputes focused 
on whether cable systems cause "traffic delays and hazards and esthetic unsightliness" 
and whether sufficient economic demand exists to support competing cable operators. Id. 
at 493. 
122. Id. at 495; see Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 
711, 714 (8th Cir. 1986). 
123. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking 
down a law requiring newspapers to grant a right-of-reply) with Red Lion Broadcasting 
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cable resembled both the unregulated print media and the more 
regulated broadcast media: 
Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech 
and the communication of ideas as do the traditional en-
terprises of newspaper and book publishers, public 
speakers and pamphleteers. [Preferred's] proposed activi-
ties would seem to implicate First Amendment interests 
as do the activities of wireless broadcasters, which were 
found to fall within the ambit of the First Amendment 
. . . even though the free speech aspects of the wireless 
broadcasters' claim were found to be outweighed by the 
government interests in regulating by reason of the scar-
city of available frequencies.124 
As the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall and O'Connor, makes clear, the Court left "open 
the question of the proper standard."12& Moreover, the concur-
rence stressed that nothing requires the Court to limit its choice 
to one of the preexisting first amendment models; it could 
choose to create a new, more appropriate standard just for cable: 
"In assessing First Amendment claims concerning cable access, 
the Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable 
television make it sufficiently analogous to another medium to 
warrant application of an already existing standard or whether 
those characteristics require a new analysis. "138 
One other point must be noted. Whatever standard the Court 
eventually creates will not apply in the same way to every type 
of cable regulation. There are numerous types of possible regula-
tion, including exclusive franchises, rate regulation, require-
ments for third-party access, and regulation of program con-
tent.127 Each form of regulation has a different effect on a cable 
operator's "speech," and each implicates a different governmen-
tal interest. Thus, the statement by one member of the Commis-
sion on Pornography that cable indecency regulation would inev-
itably lead to equal time requirements for cable programmers is 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine as applied to 
broadcasters). 
124. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494-95. 
125. Id. at 496. 
126. Id. (emphasis added). 
127. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 §§ 611,612, 621-624, 637,638, 47 
U.S.C. §§ 153, 201, 531-532, 541-544, 557-558 (Supp. III 1985). 
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in error.128 The physical scarcity rationale for the equal time re-
quirement for broadcasters remains distinct from the concerns 
of pervasiveness and availability to children that support inde-
cency regulation. 129 Although broadcasting and cable may simi-
larly implicate a particular rationale, this does not mean they 
have a similar impact on other concerns. Courts and legislators 
will, therefore, have to analyze each form of regulation sepa-
rately, to see if it is constitutionally justifiable. 130 
Lacking specific guidance from the Supreme Court, many 
lower courts have addressed the constitutionality of barring in-
decent cable programming and have tried to decide whether 
cable sufficiently differs from broadcasting, so that Pacifica 
would not apply to cable programming.131 One court distin-
guished cable from broadcasting because "[i]n the cable me-
dium, the physical scarcity that justifies content regulation in 
broadcasting is not present. "132 This distinction is irrelevant to 
the analysis of Pacifica because the Supreme Court did not rely 
on physical scarcity to uphold the regulation of broadcast 
indecency.183 
Other courts have tried a more comprehensive comparison be-
tween the two media. For example, several courts have relied on 
the following list of differences between cable television and 
128. 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 104-05 (statement of Father Bruce 
Ritter) 
Id. 
[A]lmost all of the principal religious denominations and religious broadcasters 
unanimously fought such an equation of broadcast and cable television on the 
grounds that it might seriously impede their own religious freedom to control 
their programming as they saw fit and might compel them to grant equal time to 
atheist or agnostic or anti-religious presentations. 
. . . The fact is . . . that unless we equate broadcast and cable television, the 
FCC has no constitutional right to regulate programming on cable using the in-
decency standard upheld by the Pacifica decision. 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) with FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
130. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (distinguishing "must-carry" rules, which mandated car-
riage of local broadcast signals, from public access requirements: "[U]nlike access rules, 
which serve countervailing First Amendment values by providing a forum for public or 
governmental authorities, the must-carry rules transfer control to local broadcasters who 
already have a delivery mechanism granted by the government without cost and capable 
of bypassing the cable system altogether."). 
131. E.g., Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1112-13 (D. 
Utah 1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), summarily 
aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987); Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 
1167 (D. Utah 1982); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'g 571 F. 
Supp. 125, 131-32 (S.D. Fla. 1983). 
132. Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1112. 
133. See supra discussion accompanying notes 73-74. 
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broadcasting to conclude that reliance on Pacifica to support 
regulation of indecent cable programming is "misplaced":134 
Cable 
1. User needs to subscribe. 
2. User holds power to 
cancel subscriptions. 
3. Limited advertising. 
4. Transmittal through 
wires. 
5. User receives signal on 
private cable. 
6. User pays a fee. 
7. User receives preview of 
coming attractions 
8. Distributor or 
distributee may add 
services and expanded 
spectrum of signals or 
channels and choices. 
9. Wires are privately 
owned. 
Broadcast 
1. User need not subscribe. 
2. User holds no power to 
cancel. May complain to 
FCC, station, network, 
or sponsor. 
3. Extensive advertising. 
4. Transmittal through 
public airwaves. 
5. User appropriates signals 
from the public 
airwaves. 
6. User does not pay a fee. 
7. User receives daily and 
weekly listing in public 
press or commercial 
guides. · 
8. Neither distributor nor 
distributee may add 
services or signals or 
choices. 
9. Airwaves are not 
privately owned but are 
privately controlled. 
The most remarkable feature of this comparison is that none 
of these differences, alone or in the aggregate, adequately distin-
guishes cable from broadcasting for purposes of determining the 
constitutionality of indecent programming regulation. For exam-
ple, points 1, 2, and 6 (the need to subscribe, the power to can-
cel, and the payment of a fee) seem to argue that a viewer volun-
134. Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1167. In Cruz v. Ferre, 
the district court repeated this list, 571 F. Supp. at 132, and the Eleventh Circuit later 
cited the same list, 755 F.2d at 1420 n.5. 
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tarily allows cable, but not broadcasting, to enter and remain in 
the home. Broadcast viewers, however, can turn off or throw out 
the off ending television set; thus, they possess the same choice 
as to whether or not to allow the programming into their homes. 
Pacifica hints that the universal use of broadcasting necessitates 
a remedy for indecent programming other than the discarding of 
radios and televisions, 1811 but this suggestion does not negate the 
voluntary nature of the choice to own devices that receive broad-
cast signals. 136 
Moreover, viewers in many communities need cable television 
to receive broadcast signals, either because no broadcasting sta-
tion operates nearby or because mountains or tall buildings pre-
vent over-the-air reception. 137 In such communities, cable televi-
sion is as commonplace as television sets. If owning a radio and 
owning a television set do not constitute "voluntary" acts be-
cause they represent the only way to receive broadcast signals, 
subscribing to cable is not "voluntary" when it provides the only 
way to receive broadcast signals. If such "voluntariness" marked 
the only distinction between broadcast and cable, two different 
programming standards might exist for cable depending upon 
the location of the cable system. A strange result would indeed 
occur if cable systems could not carry indecent programs in com-
munities with poor or no reception of over-the-air broadcast sig-
nals, but could carry such programming in communities with 
good broadcast reception and a low percentage of subscribers.138 
The remaining differences in the list also fail adequately to 
distinguish cable and broadcast television in the context of inde-
cent programming. Point 7 (the availability of previews) not 
only applies to both media, but the Court found it irrelevant in 
Pacifica. If prior warnings cannot completely protect broadcast 
viewers from offensive programming because they constantly 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81. 
136. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (plurality opinion) (stating that 
noise from a sound truck is inescapable). 
137. See S. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 1; see also H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 
100, at 24, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4661 (in areas with 
inadequate over-the-air reception of broadcast signals, cable "was seen as an 'essential' 
service"). Indeed, aiding reception of over-the-air broadcasting was the original purpose 
of cable television. See generally D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER 
NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 1.02(1), at 1-2 (1986). 
138. Additionally, an argument that cable television is not as ubiquitous as broad-
casting rests on precarious grounds because many estimate that cable use will steadily 
increase over the coming years. Only 42% of American households subscribed to cable in 
1985; by the end of the decade, that figure is expected to rise to 54%. See Cable Indus-
try Growth Chart, CABLEVISION, Aug. 18, 1986, at 82. 
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tune in and out, 139 prior warnings will be equally ineffective in 
protecting cable viewers with similar peripatetic viewing habits. 
Likewise, points 3 and 8 (the amount of advertising and the 
number of channels available to the programmer) have no ap-
parent relationship to the issue in question: the constitutionality 
of regulating indecent cable programs. Whether the cable 
programmer shows advertising and whether the programmer can 
choose to show indecent programming on more than one channel 
do not affect the concerns expressed by the Pacifica Court. 
Finally, points 4, 5, and 9 (transmittal through privately 
owned cables vs. public airwaves) completely misconceive the 
structure of a cable system by attempting to portray cable sys-
tems as "private" modes of communication and broadcast sys-
tems as "public." It is true that the cables that carry the pro-
grams are privately owned, but so are the antennae and 
equipment that send broadcast signals. A correct analogy, how-
ever, can be drawn between the public nature of the airwaves, 
which justifies some broadcast regulation, 140 and the public 
streets and public rights-of-way t4at a "private" cable operator 
must, by definition, utilize to construct and operate the cable 
system.141 Thus, both the cable operator and broadcaster use 
public resources to communicate with their listeners and view-
ers. Neither represents a completely public nor a completely pri-
vate communications medium.142 
139. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
140. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943). 
141. As explained by one court: 
A newspaper may reach its audience simply through the public streets or mails, 
with no more disruption to the public domain than would be caused by the typi-
cal pedestrian, motorist, or user of the mails. But a cable operator must lay the 
means of his medium underground or string it across poles in order to deliver 
his message. Obviously, this manner of using the public domain entails signifi-
cant disruption, especially to streets, alleys and other public ways. Some form of 
permission from the government must, by necessity, precede such disruptive use 
of the public domain. 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 
1981) (emphasis added), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). This is consistent with 
the Cable Act's definition of a cable system. 
[T]he term 'cable system' means a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmis-
sion paths . . . that is designed to provide cable service which includes video 
programming . . . but such term does not include ... a facility that serves only 
subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, con-
trol, or management, unless such facility or facilities uses any public right-of-
way .... 
Cable Act § 602(6), 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). 
142. As then Circuit Judge Burger explained: "The argument that a broadcaster is 
not a public utility is beside the point. True it is not a public utility in the same sense as 
strictly regulated common carriers or purveyors of power, but neither is it a purely pri-
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Additionally, it must be remembered that the "public inter-
est" in using the airwaves did not represent the justification for 
the regulation of indecent programming in Pacifica. 143 Rather, 
the Court permitted regulation because of broadcasting's access 
to the home and the ease with which children can gain access to 
the programming. These rationales arguably are applicable to 
cable as well as broadcasting.144 
As an alternate tack, those opposed to the regulation of non-
obscene cable programming may argue that Pacifica "should be 
confined to its facts, and eventually discarded as a 'derelict in 
the stream of the law.' "1411 Under this line of reasoning, Pacifica 
offers no precedential value when discussing cable television be-
cause it is a "deservedly ... limited exception [to the tradi-
tional protection of non-obscene speech], for an extreme, virtu-
ally non-replicable case .... Pacifica truly is ... a case about 
seven dirty words on radio and no more. "146 
This analysis does not suffice for two reasons. First, the Su-
preme Court does not appear ready to "discard" Pacifica. In 
1984, the Court characterized the decision as "consistent with 
our other broadcast cases.''147 In 1986, the Court cited the case 
in support of the proposition that there is "an interest in pro-
tecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken lan-
guage."m Even when the Court limited Pacifica by holding that 
it did not apply to "offensive" mail because broadcast regulation 
did not "readily translate into a justification for regulation of 
other means of communication,"149 it was not at all clear that 
vate enterprise like a newspaper or an automobile agency." Office of Communication of 
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The same 
analysis holds true for the cable operator. 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 73-96. 
144. E.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (dictum) (stating that the rationale for regulating indecent programming "is 
independent of whether the television signal comes into the home over the air or through 
a coaxial cable"). 
145. Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra note 105, at 627 n.138 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-68 (Supp. 1979)). 
146. Id. at 627 (emphasis added). 
147. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 n.13 (1984); see also New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 720, 749 
(1978) for its reliance on "the Government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth'" to 
justify regulation of indecent broadcasts). 
148. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). Pacifica was also cited 
with approval in Frisby v. Schultz, 56 U.S.L.W. 4785 (U.S. June 28, 1988) (No. 87-168). 
Thus, it is inaccurate to say, as one court striking down a cable indecency law argued, 
that "[r]ecent decisions of the Court have largely limited Pacifica to its facts." Cruz v. 
Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1421 (11th Cir. 1985). 
149. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983). Ironically, in sup-
port of this "special interest," the Court cites Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 
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the Court regarded all other electronic means of communication, 
as well as the mails, as distinguishable from b;oadcasting.1110 
Secondly, Pacifica should not be read as a case about "seven 
dirty words," but as one involving the protection of the right to 
avoid offensive material in the home. m If one accepts the 
Court's basic assumptions about the "captive" nature of the 
broadcast audience,1112 Pacifica remains consistent with earlier 
cases protecting the home dweller's right "to be let alone. "m 
The ultimate issue, then, becomes how cable television relates 
to the home dweller's right to be let alone. Is the cable viewer, 
like the home dweller in Kovacs, "practically helpless to escape 
this interference with his privacy . . . except through the protec-
tion of the municipality"?IM Is cable television, like broadcast-
ing, one of those forms of communication that cannot "be with-
held from the young [and unwilling adults] without restricting 
the expression at its source"?1H 
The very technology of cable television, however, distinguishes 
cable from these intrusive electronic means of speech because 
this technology provides the ability to block out "offensive" pro-
gramming from one home without silencing it at the source. Be-
cause cable television transmits its programming through wires 
rather than through airwaves, individual viewers can keep pro-
gramming out of their homes by selectively "blocking" the wire 
before the program reaches the television set. Indeed, cable 
technology offers two solutions that protect not only the right of 
the home dweller to avoid offensive material, but also the rights 
of the speaker and the willing viewer. 
A device called a "lock box" or a "parental control device" 
offers the first way to protect the unwilling cable viewer. 1116 The 
device allows a viewer to use a key or numeric code to "lock out" 
certain channels and keep them off the home television screen. 
U.S. 367 (1969), a decision based on spectrum scarcity, not on the intrusiveness of broad-
casting. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
150. In fact, despite the Court's stated desire "to emphasize the narrowness of our 
holding," Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750, the Court implied that indecent telephone calls could 
be analogized to indecent broadcasts. Id. at 749 & n.27. 
151. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text. 
153. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); see also 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (plurality opinion). 
154. 336 U.S. at 86-87. 
155. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978). 
156. See S. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 48. The Cable Act requires that all cable 
operators make these devices available to their subscribers. Cable Communications Pol-
icy Act of 1984 § 624(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985); see infra notes 193-
98 and accompanying text. 
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It thus protects both adults wishing to avoid even a single glance 
at "offensive" material and children whose parents do not want 
them viewing such programs. 
An "addressable converter" represents the second mechanism 
for keeping offensive programming out of the home. 1117 The 
traditional, or general, converter "converts" the electronic sig-
nals travelling through the cable so that they can be viewed on 
the television screen. Although an addressable converter per-
forms the same function, it also enables the cable operator to 
determine which channels to send to a particular home. m Thus, 
by notifying the cable operator ahead of time, subscribers can 
have the operator flick a switch and block a given channel from 
their sets until they reauthorize the channel. 
The Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornog-
raphy stated that lock boxes do not resolve the constitutional 
issue. Although the Commission's Report does not discuss ad-
dressable converters, the arguments made against lock boxes ap-
ply to both means of blocking channels. According to the Re-
port, Pacifica Foundation had argued in its brief that technology 
existed so that television sets could be programmed to prevent 
certain channels from appearing. m The Commission concluded 
that, because the Court upheld the broadcast regulation in 
Pacifica, "[t]he Supreme Court was obviously unimpressed by 
157. See S. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 41-49. 
158. Id. at 41-44. "Each subscriber has a unique electronic address, so that the cable 
headend has the opportunity to provide viewing authorization to each addressable con-
verter." Id. at 41, 44. The Cable Act does not refer to addressable converters explicitly, 
but leaves to franchising authorities the right to establish requirements for "facilities 
and equipment." Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 624(b)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 544 
(b)(l) (Supp. III 1985). The Cable Act only requires that the equipment be "cable-re-
lated." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 68, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4705. Because an addressable converter is plainly cable-related, a city 
interested in keeping indecent programming away from the homes of unwilling subscrib-
ers can require that the cable operator offer addressable converters. 
Addressable converters may only cost $20 more than nonaddressable converters. S. 
WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 44. Although some cable systems may need different wiring 
to be able to use addressable converters, a franchising authority can also require such 
"upgrading" of a cable system when the cable franchise is renewed. Cable Act § 626 
(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 546(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985); see also H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, 
at 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS at 4657 (stating that the Cable 
Act "[g]rants cities affirmative authority to require upgrading of facilities ... during the 
renewal process"). 
159. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 581 (quoting Brief for Pacifica 
Foundation at 49 n.40, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528)). 
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the 'lockbox' argument" and would consider it equally irrelevant 
in the context of cable television. 160 
This analysis is wrong for several reasons. First, the reference 
to the lock box, which appeared only in a footnote of the brief, 161 
hardly constituted a major part of the argument and was never 
discussed by either the FCC or the Supreme Court. Moreover, 
the probable reason that the Court did not discuss the device, if 
it came to their attention at all, was that a device to control 
what a viewer sees on a television set is simply not relevant to 
an analysis of an FCC ruling on indecent radio programming. As 
the Court stressed, "the focus of our review must be on the 
Commission's determination that the Carlin monologue was in-
decent as broadcast."162 Thus, Pacifica does not foreclose a find-
ing that cable lock boxes provide an appropriate means for pro-
tecting unwilling viewers. 
The Attorney General's Commission also criticized blocking 
devices because "the method is far from foolproof. "163 The Re-
port describes three instances in which "adult" programming 
"slipped through an electronic loophole.''1" The very few in-
stances when unwanted programming has slipped through, how-
ever, are insufficient to render the blocking technologies an inad-
equate solution. It is irrational to bar all indecent programming 
when virtually all offensive programs can be blocked, simply be-
cause of the freak possibility that an indecent program will both 
get through the technological barrier and be seen by an off ended 
viewer. 1611 A cable system should not be purged of programming 
160. Id. Although the Commission on Pornography makes this observation in support 
of its argument that the FCC should regulate "obscene" cable programming, id. at 573, 
their argument would apply as well to a ban on "indecent" programming. 
161. Brief for Pacifica Foundation, supra note 159, at 49 n.40. The appendix to the 
brief included an advertisement for a device called a "Video Protector." Id. at 20a. 
162. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978). There is also a difference be-
tween requiring parents to pay between $50 and $60 for the right to enjoy otherwise free 
broadcast television without fear of indecent programming, Brief for Pacifica Foundation 
supra note 159 at 20a, and requiring such an outlay in addition to other payments neces-
sary to receive cable television. The first alters the fundamental concept of the medium; 
the second is perfectly consistent. 
163. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 581. 
164. Id. at 581-82. In one case, all residents of Tampa, Florida, received adult pro-
gramming for two weeks due to a "technological anomaly that was triggered by certain 
weather conditions." Id. at 581. In a second case, the Playboy Channel mysteriously ap-
peared in place of a "Rin Tin Tin" movie on the Disney Channel. Id. at 582. Third, a 
"scrambled" adult channel was insufficiently scrambled; sound could be heard and, occa-
sionally, a picture could be seen. Id. 
165. The ludicrous nature of this argument can be seen by considering its application 
to the following scenario: 10,000 records labeled as Lawrence Welk's "World's Greatest 
Polkas" mistakenly contained songs by the Sex Pistols, including "I Want to Be Your 
Dog." The record company reported receiving "several dozen" irate calls from those 
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"that is entirely suitable for adults" to achieve a "marginal de-
gree of protection.mes The Supreme Court has struck down simi-
larly excessive regulations that would limit speech between will-
ing adults and that lacked reasonable restriction to the harm 
addressed. 187 Using another porcine analogy, the Court has 
warned us not "to burn the house to roast the pig. "168 
A federal judge has offered an alternate objection to lock 
boxes as the remedy for indecent cable programming, which 
again applies equally to addressable converters.189 This objection 
notes that lock boxes require advance planning and thereby fail 
to protect those who scan from channel to channel and whose 
viewing of a given channel is "unplanned and incomplete."170 A 
cable operator can alleviate this problem simply by notifying a 
new subscriber of the channels likely to contain occasionally "of-
fensive" programming. m Thus, the subscriber who wants to 
avoid the "single blow" of indecent programming can block out 
those channels from the · startm and still receive many other 
channels, such as broadcast channels, as well as special news and 
"family" channels.173 Such a subscriber will be able to "scan" 
without fear of encountering offensive programming; if a desired 
program will appear on one of the "suspect" channels, the sub-
complaining that the language was "awful ... typical of a rock group." Welk Disks' 
Mislabeling Isn't Just a Vicious Rumor, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1987, at 4, col. 1. Under the 
anti-lock box argument, no records could contain "indecent language" to spare the sensi-
bilities of those who might be offended if this unlikely technological mishap were to 
recur. 
166. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983). 
167. See id. (striking down ban on unsolicited mailed contraceptive advertisements); 
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (striking down a law barring the sale to 
adults of reading material that was "unsuitable" for children). 
168. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74 n.27 (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383). 
169. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1006 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J., concurring), 
summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987). 
170. Id. 
171. Such channels might include not only "adult" channels, such as the Playboy 
channel, but movie channels, such as Home Box Office, that periodically show R-rated 
movies and, perhaps, access channels on which cable operator censorship is prohibited. 
See infra text accompanying notes 261-67. 
172. Thus, cable viewers will receive even more protection than postal patrons who 
are only "able to avoid the information in [offensive] advertisements after one expo-
sure." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 78 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring). 
173. Channels designed especially for children include the Disney Channel and 
Nickelodeon. 
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scriber can easily unlock the lock box or, in the case of ad-
dressable converters, notify the operator to allow the channel 
through.174 
If lock boxes and addressable converters can protect both un-
willing listeners and unsupervised children, then no justification 
exists for a total ban on indecent cable programming. It would, 
therefore, not matter whether indecent cable programming was 
offered on the "basic tier"1711 provided to all subscribers, or to a 
higher tier for which subscribers pay an extra fee. For either 
tier, individual subscribers have the technological power to re-
strict programming for their homes. 
Some have suggested that, even if a total ban on indecent pro-
gramming is unconstitutional, regulation could simply channel 
the indecency to a later time period.178 According to one propo-
nent of this approach, though such channelling would not pro-
tect late night viewers, it would at least protect many 
households. 177 
This proposal contains a major flaw because it ignores the ba-
sic constitutional principle that "[o]ne is not to have the exer-
cise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged 
on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."178 
Time-channelling would prevent adults from viewing constitu-
tionally protected programming during daytime and early eve-
ning hours, the only time some adults have available for watch-
ing television.179 Government simply cannot use channelling to 
limit access to protected speech, absent narrow exceptions that 
do not apply to regulation of indecency on cable television. 
174. It has also been argued that "the unwanted complexity these devices introduce 
into television viewing is attested to by their lack of use." Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 
989, 1006 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J., concurring), summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 
(1987). One estimate is that fewer than one percent of cable subscribers have purchased 
lock boxes. Id. at 1003. This conclusory statement ignores the myriad other possibilities 
for lack of use, including general subscriber satisfaction with programming and lack of 
publicity of the availability of the devices. Additionally, an addressable system, requiting 
only a telephone call to the cable operator, creates no such complexity. 
175. See Cable Act§ 602(2), 47 U.S.C. § 522(2). 
176. See Jones, 800 F.2d at 1007 (Baldock, J., concurring) (stating that such channel-
ling would be constitutional). 
177. Id. at 1006. 
178. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (quoting 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)). 
179. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 774 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that alternatives to afternoon broadcasts "involve[d) the expenditure of money, 
time, and effort that many of those wishing to hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able 
to afford"); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984) (find-
ing that channelling "dial-a-porn" telephone service to late hours "denies access to 
adults between certain hours"). 
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For example, a content-neutral regulation that governs all 
speech may constitutionally impose time, place, or manner re-
strictions. Thus, the Court has upheld a restriction limiting the 
distribution and sale of religious material at a state fair to as-
signed booths because the rule "applies evenhandedly to all who 
wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit 
funds."180 By contrast, the Court struck down a ban on the in-
clusion by a public utility of discussions of controversial issues 
in its billing envelopes because the prohibition was not content-
neutral.181 The channelling of only "indecent" cable program-
ming resembles the billing envelope restriction and similarly 
does not constitute content-neutral regulation. 
The Supreme Court has permitted the zoning of sexually-ori-
ented movie houses, yet categorized such zoning as content-neu-
tral because the regulations did not aim at the content of the 
films, but at the secondary effects of such theaters.182 These 
cases do not apply, however, to an analysis of the regulation of 
cable programming. Even when upholding such zoning, the 
Court has reaffirmed prior holdings that regulation is impermis-
sible when "the justifications offered by the city rested primarily 
on the city's interest in protecting its citizens from exposure to 
unwanted, 'offensive' speech."183 Because indecent cable pro-
gramming creates no secondary effects to either a city, neighbor-
hood, or individual home and because the possible exposure to 
unwanted "offensive" speech presents its only "effect,"184 such 
programming may not be "zoned" to a late night time slot.1811 
180. Heffron v. Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981). 
181. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980). 
182. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986); Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The "secondary effects" that moti-
vated the city of Renton, Washington, included crime prevention, protection of the city's 
retail trade, maintenance of property values, and general protection and preservation of 
the quality of the city's neighborhoods and commercial districts. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48; 
see also Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
183. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (distinguishing zoning 
of movie houses from a ban on nudity in movies shown at drive-in theaters held facially 
invalid in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.s·. 205 (1975)). Professor Nimmer has 
termed the Young-Erznoznik distinction, "the difference between a non-speech restric-
tion and an anti-speech restriction." M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2-99 
(1984). 
184. See, e.g., Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1006 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J., 
concurring) (stating that diverse programming should be available to all cable subscrib-
ers, regardless of whether they object to "patently offensive indecent material being 
presented during family viewing hours"). 
185. Cases upholding laws requiring that the covers of sexually oriented publications 
displayed for sale be concealed if they could be seen by minors, Upper Midwest Book-
sellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); M.S. News Co. v. 
Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983), also do not apply to cable programming. Not 
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Such channelling also fails to represent the least restrictive 
means for advancing the goal of ensuring that the opportunity to 
enjoy the diversity of programming offered by cable television is, 
in the words of one judge, "available to all who are willing to 
subscribe, even those who object to patently offensive indecent 
material being presented during family viewing hours.,,.88 The 
technology of cable television-specifically, lock boxes and ad-
dressable converters-permits the protection of this objecting 
subscriber without infringing on the rights of non-objecting 
subscribers. 187 
Accordingly, any governmental attempt to limit the hours that 
a cable operator may offer constitutionally protected indecent 
programming must be struck down, just as a total ban would be. 
Each proposed limitation on speech, however valid the underly-
ing governmental purpose, is "not reasonably restricted to the 
evil with which it is said to deal.m88 
B. The Legislative Solution 
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984189 created a 
complex scheme for regulating pornography on cable television. 
Congress attempted to balance the competing interests of those 
who wished to keep such programming out of their homes with 
the first amendment rights of programmers and willing view-
only does uncertainty over the constitutionality of these laws continue, American Book-
sellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 792 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 55 U.S.L.W. 
3569 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1987); Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n, 780 F.2d at 1399-1406 
(Lay, C.J., dissenting), but these laws are far less restrictive of first amendment rights 
than limiting the hours for viewing certain cable programs. The display limitations do 
not limit the ability of an adult who wishes to buy and read the publication from doing 
so whenever convenient: "adults are still able to view any of the material in a free and 
unfettered fashion by purchasing it." Id. at 1395. By contrast, the limit on cable pro-
gramming absolutely prevents adults from viewing the programming when they desire. 
Additionally, although the display ban has been characterized as "a reasonable means of 
attempting to control the merchandising to minors of sexually explicit material obscene 
as to them," id. at 1396, the existence of technological means for controlling minors' 
access to objectionable cable programming, see supra text accompanying notes 156-58, 
renders the time limitation an "unreasonable means" for furthering the governmental 
interest. 
186. Jones, 800 F.2d at 1006 (Baldock, J., concurring). 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58. 
188. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see also Frisby v. Scultz, 108 S. Ct. 
2495, 2502 (1988) (stating that regulations must be narrowly tailored to protect only 
unwilling recipients of the communications") (emphasis added). 
189. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. III 
1985) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.). 
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ers.190 To protect the unwilling viewer, Congress mandated that 
the cable operator make "lock boxes" available to block out pos-
sibly offensive programming. The statute contains a complex 
scheme for regulating program content, which includes a variety 
of standards that depend on whether the material is "obscene" 
or "indecent" and on whether programming is offered on chan-
nels within the cable operator's editorial control or on access 
channels. The heart of the balance, however, provides that, ex-
cept for obscenity, the speaker shall not be silenced, the willing 
viewer shall receive the programming, and the unwilling viewer 
shall be protected by technology, not by the censor. 
1. The Right Not to See- In drafting the Cable Act, Con-
gress was "extremely concerned" about the cablecasting of sexu-
ally explicit material, especially to children.191 At the same time, 
Congress recognized that the first amendment precludes a sys-
tem of governmental censorship of cable programming.192 
Although permitting franchising authorities to ban obscene 
material completely,193 Congress devised a method for dealing 
with indecent, but not obscene, material.194 Section 624 of the 
Act requires that all cable operators make available to their sub-
scribers the technological means for blocking out particular 
cable channels: "In order to restrict the viewing of programming 
which is obscene or indec~nt, upon the request of a subscriber, a 
cable operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which 
the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable service 
during periods selected by that subscriber."1911 
The requirement of so-called lock boxes demonstrates the 
congressional desire to protect the right to avoid certain kinds of 
programming in the home without restricting the rights of those 
who wish to receive the programs. Congress considered these de-
vices a solution to the thorny cable indecency problem, stating 
that a lock box requirement "provides one means to effectively 
restrict the availability of such programming, particularly with 
respect to child viewers, without infringing the First Amend-
190. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4706. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. See infra text accompanying notes 199-203. 
194. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEws at 4707. 
195. § 624(d)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A). 
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ment rights of the cable operator, the cable programmer, or 
other cable viewers."196 
2. Obscenity and the Cable Act- All levels of government 
may ban obscene cable programming under the Cable Act. Sec-
tion 639 makes it a federal criminal offense, subject to a $10,000 
fine or imprisonment for up to two years, to transmit obscene 
programming over a cable system;197 section 638 permits state 
and local governments to impose civil and criminal liability for 
the cablecasting of obscene programming;198 section 624 permits 
franchising authorities to include in a franchise agreement either 
a ban on, or restrictions covering, obscene programming.199 
When using the term "obscene" in these sections, Congress ex-
plicitly adopted the Miller v. California obscenity standard.200 
Some confusion exists over whether a franchising authority 
may permit obscene programming. Section 624 states that a 
franchising authority may specify in a franchise that obscene 
programming "shall not be provided or shall be provided subject 
to conditions." As the Commission on Pornography points out, 
however, "Section [624] seems to contemplate allowing the oper-
ator to provide obscene programming while Section [639] makes 
196. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4707. In an interpretive rule, the FCC attempted to undo this balance 
by stating that a cable operator need only provide a lock box able to block out "any 
channel over which [the cable operator] has editorial control," but not public and com-
mercial access channels. Amendment of Parts 1, 63, and 76 of the Commission's Rules to 
Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 
18,655 (1985) [hereinafter Implementation]. Time on commercial access channels is 
leased to programmers who are not affiliated with the cable operator; "PEG" channels 
are those used for public, educational, and governmental access programming. See infra 
discussion accompanying notes 246-48. 
In ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court stated that there was 
"no discernible basis in the statute or the legislative history" for the exclusion of these 
channels and ordered the FCC to delete its "improper suggestion." Thus, cable operators 
must provide a lock box capable of blocking all channels, including access channels. 
197. Cable Act § 639, 47 U.S.C. § 559. 
198. Cable Act§ 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558. A "franchising authority" is the governmental 
authority empowered to issue a cable franchise. § 602(9), 47 U.S.C. § 522(9). Although 
this regulation is usually done by cities, H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 23, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4660, some states, such as Rhode 
Island, retain control of the franchising process. See RI. GEN. LAWS § 39-19-3 (1984). 
199. Cable Act § 624, 47 U.S.C. § 544. 
200. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS, at 4706 ("The Committee adopts the Supreme Court's obscenity formu-
lation as set down in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)."). For the definition of the 
Miller standard, see supra note 8. Even though viewers watch cable programming in the 
home, the right of privacy established in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), would 
not protect transmission of obscene programming because the transmission originates 
outside the home. See United States v. 12 200-ft Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127-28 
(1973). 
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it a crime to do so."201 Thus, the question becomes whether a 
local franchising authority can permit, albeit subject to condi-
tions, programming that federal law would otherwise bar. 
If the programming expressly permitted by the local govern-
ment would still be subject to federal criminal penalties, the 
statutory language "or shall be provided subject to conditions" 
would be meaningless. Although it would be unusual to allow a 
local government to immunize conduct from federal stricture, 
the field of obscenity regulation might be the area of law where 
such immunization makes the most sense. Perhaps Congress, 
aware of the importance of judging obscenity by "community 
standards,"202 has decided to permit each community to have 
the final say on whether to allow, within its borders, cable pro-
grams that might meet the definition of "obscene."203 Thus, a 
program permitted by the local franchising authority would be 
protected against charges of violating the federal obscenity 
provision. 
3. Is Indecency Prohibited?- Whether the Cable Act bans 
"indecent" cable programs and permits local governments to 
ban such programs presents an even more difficult question. 
Section 639 criminalizes the cablecasting of programs that are 
"obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the 
United States."20• Similarly, section 624 permits franchising au-
thorities to include provisions in their franchise agreement that 
bar, or subject to conditions, the cablecasting of programming 
201. 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 485; see also Meyerson, The Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. 
REv. 543, 599 n.327 (1985). 
202. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974): 
{ A] 'community' approach may well result in material being proscribed as ob-
scene in one community but not in another .... But communities throughout 
the Nation are in fact diverse, and it must be remembered that, in cases such as 
this one, the Court is confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of 
the diverse communities within our society and of individuals. 
Id. at 107 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-01 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added)); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) ("People in 
different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be stran-
gled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity."). 
203. Cf. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). Though holding that the lack of 
a state obscenity law would not bar federal prosecution for sending obscenity through 
the mails in that state, the Court stated: 
Even though the State's law is not conclusive with regard to the attitudes of the 
local community on obscenity, nothing we have said is designed to imply that 
the Iowa statute should not have been introduced into evidence . . . . On the 
contrary, the local statute on obscenity provides relevant evidence of the mores 
of the community whose legislative body enacted the law. 
Id. at 307-08. 
204. Cable Act § 639, 47 U.S.C. § 559. 
174 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:1 & 2 
that is "obscene or ... otherwise unprotected by the Constitu-
tion of the United States."2011 
Congress did not explicitly define the phrase "otherwise un-
protected" contained in these two sections. Furthermore, the 
House Report gives only two specific examples of this "otherwise 
unprotected" speech: "fighting words" and speech presenting "a 
'clear and present danger' to public order."206 In its discussion of 
indecency, however, the Report noted that the Supreme Court 
had upheld the indecency standard for broadcasting in Pacifica, 
but that lower courts had struck down the standard when ap-
plied to cable.207 Without taking a stand on the proper constitu-
tional standard for cable television, the Report stated that the 
statutory language "would also permit changing constitutional 
interpretations to be incorporated into the standard set forth in 
[section] 624(d)(l), should those judicial interpretations at some 
point in the future deem additional standards, such as inde-
cency, constitutionally valid as applied to cable."208 
Congress's apparent attempt to create a flexible standard, one 
that will encompass ·indecent programming if and only if permit-
ted to do so by "judicial interpretation" of the Constitution, 
contains several major problems.209 First, even in Pacifica, the 
Court did not say that indecency was "unprotected by the Con-
stitution."210 The Court held that indecent broadcasts could be 
205. Cable Act § 624(d)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 544 (d)(l). The Act establishes a different 
regulatory scheme for programming shown on public and commercial access channels. 
See infra text accompanying notes 261-79. 
206. HR REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4706. 
207. See id. at 69-70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS at 4706-07 
(discussing Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television, Inc. 
v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 
F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982)). 
208. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4706 (emphasis added). The House Report, in discussing the federal 
penalties imposed by § 639, does not use the word "indecency," but instead states that 
the penalties apply to "pornographic programming." Id. at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. 
CODE CoNG. & AoMIN. NEWS at 4732. 
Though the House Report never states that the federal criminal provision of § 639 
and the regulatory provision of§ 624(d)(l) have the same meaning, it is probably safe to 
assume that Congress intended the phrase "obscene or otherwise unprotected by the 
Constitution" to have the same meaning in both sections. 
209. The House Report does not indicate to which level of court the phrase "judicial 
interpretation" refers. Id. at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 
4706. If a state or federal district court permits regulation of cable indecency, will that 
interpretation rewrite the statute, even if other courts disagree? In the name of cer-
tainty, at least, the only "judicial" interpretation that could matter would be that of the 
United States Supreme Court. 
210. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) 
("Although [indecent] words ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are 
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regulated despite their protection under the Constitution. Thus, 
even if the Supreme Court were to hold that the rationale in 
Pacifica could be applied in toto to cable television, thus permit-
ting the regulation of the appearance of indecency on cable, the 
literal statutory language of the Cable Act prohibiting (or per-
mitting regulation of) "unprotected" speech still would not en-
compass indecency.211 
A second problem is practical: the application of an "inde-
cency" standard would bar much popular programming. As one 
member of the Commission on Pornography noted: 
[I]f the "indecency" standard currently in force with re-
gard to broadcast television were also imposed on cable 
television, most of the mainline Hollywood films cur-
rently on view in theaters across the country could not be 
shown on home television served by cable. It is hardly 
likely, even inconceivable, that the courts . . . would up-
hold such an extension of the indecency standard to 
cable television.212 
A final, and related, problem comes from the question of 
whether section 639, a federal criminal provision, is unconstitu-
tionally vague. It is hardly likely that Congress intended cable 
operators throughout the country to read section 639 as sud-
denly prohibiting them from presenting "most of the mainline 
Hollywood films."213 Yet it remains unclear how else courts 
would apply an "indecency" standard to cable programming. 
This uncertainty violates the precept issued by the Supreme 
Court: "[C]riminal statutes must be so precise and unambiguous 
that the ordinary person can know how to avoid unlawful con-
not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment."); cf. Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that 
obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment."). 
211. Brenner and Price have pointed out that Congress took the phrase "otherwise 
unprotected" from an earlier version of a bill that later evolved into the Cable Act. D. 
BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, § 6.09 [3J[c), at 6-95 n.46 (citing S. 66, as reported 
by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, S. REP. No. -67, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)). The report accompanying that bill stressed that "otherwise 
unprotected" did not mean indecency, but material such as child pornography that was 
unprotected, even if not obscene. Id; see, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
212. 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 104 (statement of Father Bruce 
Ritter). 
213. Home Box Office, the most popular movie channel, with over 14 million sub-
scribers, Cable Services Subscriber Count, CABLEVISION Sept. 29, 1986, at 64, shows 
many films containing "indecency," including Kramer v. Kramer, Coming Home, The 
Deerhunter, and One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest. Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra 
note 105, at 612. 
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duct. ."2u The Court has further stressed that where a crim-
inal law touches on first amendment rights, "government may 
regulate ... only with narrow specificity."2111 The Court requires 
this heightened degree of specificity in the area of free speech to 
avoid any potential chilling effect on constitutionally protected 
speech. With a vague statute, speakers may decide that they can 
only avoid breaking the law "by restricting their conduct to that 
which is unquestionably safe."216 
The interpretation of section 639 described in the House Re-
port thus appears too vague to pass constitutional muster. Imag-
ine a cable programmer desiring to present George Carlin 
describing the "seven words you can't say on television" or the 
movie Carnal Knowledge.217 A look at section 639 informs pro-
grammers that they may not show programming that is "obscene 
or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United 
States." The term "obscenity," though imprecise, "is a term suf-
ficiently definite in legal meaning to give a defendant notice of 
the charge against him."218 The Supreme Court, however, has 
found that neither the Carlin monologue nor the movie is "ob-
scene,"219 despite the "vulgar and offensive"220 language con-
tained in the monologue and the nudity and depictions of "ulti-
mate !!!ex acts"221 presented in the movie. 
To determine the legality of presenting the two programs, 
then, the programmer must determine whether they qualify as 
"otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United 
States." Because neither program presents fighting words nor a 
clear and present danger to society, a programmer must decide 
214. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 693 (1948); see also Musser v. Utah, 333 
U.S. 95, 97 (1948) ("Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it fails 
to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding .... "). 
215. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (stating that if a "law interferes with the right of free speech or 
of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply"). 
216. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). 
217. Carnal Knowledge was a critically acclaimed 1971 film about "two young college 
men, roommates and lifelong friends forever preoccupied with their sex lives." Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 158 (1974) (quoting Alpert, Review of Carnal Knowledge, SATUR-
DAY REv., July 3, 1971, at 18). 
218. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119 (1974) (emphasis added). But cf. 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Any 
effort to draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary [for obscenity] must resort to such 
indefinite concepts as 'prurient interest,' 'patent offensiveness,' 'serious literary value,' 
and the like."). 
219. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 
U.S. 153, 161 (1974). 
220. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). 
221. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161. 
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whether section 639 prohibits them because of their "inde-
cency. "222 It would be utterly impossible for a programmer to 
know whether section 639 forbids indecency because Congress 
itself did not know. Congress has thus deliberately drafted a 
paradigm of vagueness. 
Professor Laurence Tribe created the following hypothetical 
law to illustrate an unquestionably "patently vague" statute: "It 
shall be a crime to say anything in public unless the speech is 
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments."223 Though 
no legislative body would actually enact Professor Tribe's stat-
ute, section 639 accomplishes exactly the same result as would 
the statute. By criminalizing the cablecasting of all programming 
that is unprotected by the Constitution, Congress has made it "a 
crime to say anything [on cable television] unless the speech is 
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments." 
Both the hypothetical statute and the Cable Act create the 
same problem: 
[T]he Constitution does not, in and of itself, provide a 
bright enough line to guide primary conduct, and ... a 
law whose reach into protected spheres is limited only by 
the background assurance that unconstitutional applica-
tions will eventually be set aside is a law that will deter 
too much that is in fact protected.22" 
Thus, to prevent unconstitutional vagueness-to meet the cer-
tainty required by the due process clause and to avoid deterring 
protected speech-courts and local governments should give a 
limiting construction to section 639 and interpret it as only 
criminalizing "obscene" speech.2211 
222. The Court in Pacifica did not decide whether the FCC's definition of indecency 
as "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and or-
gans," Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975), was unconstitutionally vague. Pacifica, 
438 U.S. at 742-43. The Court did cite a dictionary definition of "indecent": "Webster 
defines the term as 'a: altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature of things or 
what circumstances would dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly suitable: 
UNSEEMLY . . . b: not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality; . . .' 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740 n.14 
(deletions in original). 
223. L. TRIBE, supra note 52, § 12-26, at 716 (emphasis added). 
224. Id. (emphasis in original). 
225. The Court accomplished a similar construction in Hamling v. United States, 418 
U.S. 87, 98, 118 (1974) (interpreting "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile," 
18 U.S.C. § 1461, as limited to obscenity). 
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In sum, the phrase "obscene or otherwise unprotected by the 
Constitution," contained in both section 639's criminal offense 
provision and section 624's regulatory provision, should be read 
to comport both with its plain meaning and with constitutional 
requirements. "Indecent" programming, which remains indeed 
"protected" by the Constitution, should not be included within 
the phrase. 
4. Indecency and Preemption- Confusion also exists as to 
whether the Cable Act preempts state and local governmental 
regulation of cable indecency. The Cable Act prohibits content 
regulation by state and local government except where the Act 
specifically preserves such power. Section 624(0(1) bars all levels 
of government from "imposing requirements regarding the pro-
vision or content of cable services, except as expressly provided 
in this title."226 Section 638 preserves the ability of state and 
local governments to regulate "libel, slander, obscenity, incite-
ment, invasions of privacy, false and misleading advertising, or 
other similar laws."227 It remains unclear, however, whether sec-
tion 638 permits local regulation of indecent programming as 
wen.22s 
The ultimate question in interpreting section 638, of course, 
becomes whether indecency is "similar" to obscenity and, thus, 
covered by the section. Indecency and obscenity may appear 
"similar" in that both involve "offensive" depictions of sex.229 
They remain fundamentally dissimilar, however, in the type of 
material they encompass: "Prurient appeal is an element of the 
obscene, but the normal definition of 'indecent' merely refers to 
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality."230 
226. Cable Act § 624(a), 47 U.S.C. § 544(a) (emphasis added); see also Cable Act 
§ 636(c), 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (stating that any law "inconsistent with this Act shall be 
deemed to be preempted and superseded"). 
227. Cable Act§ 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558 (emphasis added). 
228. One court has concluded that "the legislative history shows that Sec. 638 does 
not preserve state power to regulate indecency." Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkin-
son, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Utah 1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 
at 989 (10th Cir. 1986), summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987). Nonetheless, the court 
immediately contradicted itself by declaring that it must rule on the constitutionality of 
indecency laws because ,"the final resolution of the pre-emption question necessarily re-
quires a ruling on first amendment issues." Id. If, however, Congress indeed preempted 
local regulation of indecency, there is no need to discuss the constitutionality of such 
regulation. It is perfectly logical for Congress to preempt regulation that would otherwise 
be permissible. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (uphold-
ing under the 1934 Communications Act federal preemption of a state ban on liquor 
advertisements on cable). 
229. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality opin-
ion) ("These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends."). 
230. Id. at 740. 
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The legislative history of the Cable Act provides further evi-
dence that Congress did not intend for section 638 to include 
"indecency." Although Congress did not use the term "inde-
cency" in section 638, it used the term elsewhere in the stat-
ute. 231 As one court commented: "These explicit indecency pro-
visions strongly imply that Congress deliberately omitted 
indecency from Sec[tion] 638. It is unlikely that Congress would 
accidentally omit indecency from Sec[tion] 638, which defines 
important areas of federal, state and local power, and remember 
to include indecency in other sections of the Act."232 Thus, Con-
gress may have intended to combat obscenity by authorizing 
state and local criminal and civil penalties in addition to provid-
ing federal sanctions. As for indecent programming, perhaps 
Congress intended the remedy to be the availability of lock 
boxes-a remedy with a less restrictive effect on free speech 
interests. 233 
Alternatively, Congress may have preferred that negotiations 
between the cable operator and the city produce any ban on in-
decent programming, assuming the constitutionality of any such 
ban. Congress could possibly have decided that a franchise nego-
tiated between the cable operator and the municipality repre-
sents a more appropriate place for working out difficult areas of 
content regulation than a unilaterally imposed state or local law. 
In section 624, Congress stressed that both parties have input 
into this sort of franchise provision: "Nothing in this title shall 
be construed as prohibiting a franchising authority and a cable 
231. See, e.g., Cable Act § 624(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (requiring signal blocking 
devices, so-called "lock boxes," to be provided "[i]n order to restrict the viewing of pro-
gramming which is obscene or indecent .... ") (emphasis added); Cable Act § 612(h), 
47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (permitting local regulation of programming on commercial access 
channels if the programming is "obscene, or is in conflict with community standards in 
that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent") (emphasis added). 
232. Community Television, 611 F. Supp. at 1104. This analysis is strengthened by 
the requirement in one of those "explicit indecency provisions" that every cable operator 
make a lock box available to subscribers. § 624(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2). Congress 
intended this device, which allows a viewer to "lock out" certain channels and keep them 
off the home television screen, to provide "one means to effectively restrict the availabil-
ity of [indecent] programming, particularly with respect to child viewers." H.R. REP. No. 
934, supra note 100, at 70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4707; 
see supra discussion at notes 191-96. Thus, when Congress considered the question of 
"indecency," it did so in the context of lock boxes, but not when giving localities the 
power to impose liability for programming. 
233. This balance is reflected in the language of the House Report that describes lock 
boxes as "one means to effectively restrict the availability of such [indecent] program-
ming ... without infringing the First Amendment rights of the cable operator, the cable 
programmer, or other cable viewers." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 70, reprinted 
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4707. 
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company from specifying, in franchise or renewal thereof, that 
certain cable services shall not be provided or shall be provided 
subject to conditions, if . . . obscene or otherwise unprotected 
by the Constitution of the United States."234 This language con-
tr~sts with other sections of the Cable Act, such as those cover-
ing public access and franchise renewal, that allow a municipal-
ity unilaterally to place certain requirements in the franchise. 2311 
Although Senator Goldwater stated that he understood Sec-
tion 639 to cover indecency "if otherwise constitutionally per-
missible, "238 his conclusion probably did not represent the intent 
of the full Congress. The House Report contains no similar dec-
laration, 237 and Senator Goldwater'.s remarks were not spoken 
during congressional debate but were instead inserted after-
wards in the Congressional Record.238 Because of the impossibil-
ity of definitively determining whether Congress intended to in-
clude "indecency" among the "similar" laws preserved by 
section 638, it is probably best to use the reasoning of the Su-
234. Cable Act § 624(d)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(l) (emphasis added). It is possible, 
however, that§ 624(d)(l) does not encompass indecency either. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 204-25. 
235. See Cable Act § 611(b), 44 U.S.C. § 53l(b) ("A franchising authority may in its 
request for proposals require as part of franchise . . . that channel capacity be desig-
nated for public, educational, or governmental use .... ") (emphasis added); 
§ 626(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 546 (b)(2) (requiring proposals for franchise renewal to "contain 
such material as the franchising authority may require, including proposals for an up-
grade of the cable system") (emphasis added). 
236. 130 CONG. REC. Sl4,289 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
237. The House Report states that § 639 preserves: 
the criminal or civil liability of cable programmers or cable operators with re-
spect to . . . state and local laws not inconsistent with this title relating to libel, 
slander, obscenity, incitement, privacy, false or misleading advertising, or other 
similar areas of law. . . . 
The Committee does not intend to affect liability which might result from 
other speech which may be held by the courts to be unentitled to constitutional 
protection (as discussed in relation to § 624(d)). 
H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & AoMIN. 
NEWS at 4732 (emphasis added). · 
The reference to the earlier discussion can have two meanings. On the one hand, that 
discussion of § 624(d) did say that "obscenity" in § 624 will include "indecency" if the 
courts permit. Id. at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CONG. & AnMIN. NEWS at 4706. On 
the other hand, if the earlier discussion is meant simply to illustrate unprotected speech 
"other" than those (such as obscenity) that the preceding sentence listed, the reference 
would be to unprotected speech such as "fighting words" and that posing a "clear and 
present danger" to the public order. Id. The House Report discussion of "other" speech, 
therefore, does not establish whether Congress intended to include "indecency" within 
§ 638. 
238. Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Utah 
1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), summarily aff'd, 
107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987). 
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preme Court in other cases involving obscenity laws written in 
unclear language: 
[W]e do have a duty to authoritatively construe federal 
statutes where a "serious doubt of constitutionality is 
raised" and "a construction of the statute is fairly possi-
ble by which the question may be avoided." If and when 
a "serious doubt" is raised as to the vagueness of [statu-
tory language]. . . we are prepared to construe such 
terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of that specific "hard 
core" sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. Cali-
fornia. Of course, Congress could always define other spe-
cific "hard core" conduct. 239 
A "serious doubt" does exist as to the constitutionality of reg-
ulating indecent cable programming;240 in fact, Congress ex-
pressed such doubts while drafting the Cable Act.2" 1 Addition-
ally, there is a construction of section 638 that avoids the 
question of its constitutionality. Accordingly, the vague statu-
tory language, "libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, invasions of 
privacy, false and misleading advertising, or other similar laws," 
contained in section 638 should be read to preserve local author-
ity to regulate speech over cable television only if Congress un-
derstood such regulation to be constitutional when it drafted the 
Cable Act in 1984. Indecency, omitted from the statutory list, 
would not be subject to state and local regulation, unless and 
until Congress decided to add it to its list. 
5. Access: Regulating the Electronic Soapbox- In drafting 
the Cable Act, Congress sought to protect the cable operator's 
right of free expression when presenting programming to the 
239. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 113 (1974) (quoting United States v. 12 
200-ft Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)) (citations omitted). In Hamling, the 
Court construed the language in 18 U.S.C. § 1461 barring "obscene, lewd, indecent, 
filthy or vile" material from the mails as limited "to patently offensive representations or 
descriptions of that specific 'hard core' sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. 
California." Hamling, 418 U.S. at 114. The Court refused to place a similar limitation on 
statutory language in Pacifica. This holding does not affect the interpretation of § 638, 
because, the Pacifica statute, unlike § 638, expressly included the word "indecent." 
("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio commu-
nication .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) (emphasis added)). As the Pacifica Court stated, 
"The plain language of the statute does not support [a limiting interpretation]. The 
words 'obscene, indecent, or profane' are written in the disjunctive, implying that each 
has a separate meaning." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978). 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 107-88. 
241. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69-70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4706-07; see also supra text accompanying notes 207-08. 
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public;242 yet Congress remained equally concerned with protect-
ing the rights of the members of a community to communicate 
via the cable system. Congress recognized that the technology of 
cable television could, for the first time, provide the public with 
effective access to a medium of mass communication, without in-
fringing on the first amendment rights of the "owner" of the me-
dium. 243 Congress thus included third party access requirements 
in the Cable Act to ensure that many speakers would be able to 
communicate through a cable system, and that the single cable 
operator in town would not be able to exercise unlimited power 
as gatekeeper over the entire cable system. Congress stated that 
access requirements, like antitrust laws,244 constitute "structural 
regulations" that limit concentration of media control and in-
crease the diversity of information sources, without imposing 
governmental control of content.245 
The Cable Act provides two ways for parties unaffiliated with 
the cable operator to obtain access to the cable system: public 
access channels that the franchise agreement itself can re-
quire, 246 and commercial access, which the Cable Act mandates 
for systems with thirty-six or more channels.247 A major differ-
ence between these two forms of access is that the cable operator 
traditionally provides channel time on public access free of 
242. See id. at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4706 (stating 
that § 624 bars franchising authorities from requiring cable operators to carry "a partic-
ular news service, a specific program, etc."). 
243. One of the greatest challenges over the years in establishing communications 
policy has been assuring access to the electronic media by people other than the licensees 
or owners of those media. The development of cable television, with its abundance of 
channels, can provide the public and program providers the meaningful access that, up 
until now, has been difficult to obtain. Id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4667. 
244. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("Freedom of 
the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction 
repression of that freedom by private interests."). 
245. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 32, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4669. The most recent court case has found cable access rules to be 
constitutional. Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D. R.I. 1983), va-
cated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). But see Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 
F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (stating in 
dictum that the access rules imposed by the FCC were unconstitutional). 
246. Cable Act § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531. The franchise can also set aside channels for 
educational and governmental access. Id. 
247. Cable Act § 612, 47 U.S.C. § 532. A system with between 36 and 54 activated 
channels-that is, channels available for use-must set aside 10% of its channels (not 
counting those whose use federal law and regulation mandate or prohibit). A system with 
between 55 and 100 channels must set aside 15% of such channels. A system with more 
than 100 channels must set aside 15% of all channels. Cable Act § 612(b), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 532(b). 
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charge, while commercial acc~ss users must pay a rate negoti-
ated with the cable operator.248 
a. The cable operator and access- Before the passage of the 
Cable Act, many cable operators tried to keep obscene or inde-
cent programming off both kinds of access channels by prescree-
ning programming. Cable companies justified this practice as 
necessary to determine whether the programming would subject 
the cable system to legal liability for transmitting obscene or in-
decent programming.249 Past FCC practice made cable operators 
justifiably apprehensive about the possible imposition of such li-
ability. In the 1970's, FCC regulations had expressly made cable 
operators liable for obscene and indecent access programs, re-
quiring them to keep such programming off the access chan-
nels. 2110 The FCC's rules required operators to prescreen any pro-
grams suspected of including "questionable" programming and 
to refuse to allow the airing of the program if the programmer 
refused to delete the "offending portion."21n The FCC also told 
operators that they might have to bar offending programmers 
from using the channel "for a considerable length of time. "2112 
In 1978, the Eighth Circuit struck down the FCC rules.2113 The 
court found the rules fatally flawed because they "created a 
corps of involuntary government surrogates, but without provid-
ing the procedural safeguards respecting 'prior restraint' re-
248. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 48, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4685. 
249. 1 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW 11 15.07(1), at 15-15 
(1987) (noting that cable operators viewed this practice as necessary "solely for the pur-
pose of determining whether transmission will subject the system to legal liability") (em-
phasis added); see also D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, § 6.04(6], at 6-40 n.48 
(describing required prescreening by cable operator in Evanston, Illinois); Hofbauer, 
"Cableporn" and the First Amendment: Perspectives on Content Regulation of Cable 
Television, 35 FED. COMM. L. J. 139, 189-90 (1983) (describing how New York City's Po-
lice Department Public Morals Squad put "pressure" on local cable company to censor 
access program containing "adult entertainment"). 
250. Clarification of § 76.256 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 59 
F.C.C.2d 984 (1976). 
251. Id. at 985. 
252. Id. Such a requirement would be an unconstitutional prior restraint. See Man-
ual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 504 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that it was 
unconstitutional to allow "the Postmaster General to exclude all matter sent by a person 
who had previously sent violative material"); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931). 
253. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on 
other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The Eighth Circuit also found the FCC's access rules 
to be beyond the scope of the agency's regulatory power and a violation of the cable 
operator's first amendment rights. 571 F.2d at 1035-56. The Supreme Court affirmed 
solely on the ground that the rules exceeded the FCC's statutory authority. 440 U.S. at 
709. 
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quired by the government."2M The Supreme Court has required 
strict procedural safeguards to reduce the risk that regulation of 
obscenity will lead to a burdening of protected expression.2n 
Any plan for administrative review of material for obscenity 
must: (1) require prompt judicial review of all administrative de-
terminations of obscenity; (2) place the burdens on the censor of 
initiating review and of proving the material is unprotected; and 
(3) limit any administrative restraint on the material to the 
shortest time necessary for obtaining a final judicial review.2&6 
For a regulatory scheme for access channels to be constitu-
tional under the Court's guidelines, therefore, the government 
must ensure that the final determination as to whether an access 
program may be cablecast rests with the independent judici-
ary.2117 The censoring authority would bear the burdens of bring-
ing the program before the judiciary as quickly as possible and 
proving that the program met the legal definition of obscenity. 
These are indeed heavy burdens. The Supreme Court has delib-
erately placed them on governments that are regulating nonpro-
tected speech to "ensure against the curtailment of constitution-
ally protected expression, which is often separated from 
obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line."2118 Furthermore, 
governments may not avoid this constitutional mandate by re-
quiring that a nongovernmental party do the censoring.2119 In 
1981, the FCC recognized that its requirements for censorship of 
access programming by cable operators lacked the necessary 
procedural safeguards and removed its rules imposing liability 
on operators for such programming.260 
254. Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d at 1056. 
255. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) ("The sepa-
ration of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for ... sensitive tools .... "). 
256. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 (1975) (concerning access 
to municipal theater); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971) (discussing regulation of 
the mails); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (considering motion picture 
censorship). These requirements are often referred to as "Freedman requirements," after 
the first case to enunciate them. 
257. "Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he 
may well be less responsive than a court-part of an independent branch of govern-
ment-to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression." Freedman, 380 
U.S. at 57-58. 
258. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66. 
259. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009 (1982) (holding that one indicium of 
state action is whether private action has been "dictated by any rule of conduct imposed 
by the State"). 
260. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning 
the Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of § 76.251, 
87 F.C.C.2d 40, 42 (1981) ("(A] rule which requires the cable system operator to censor 
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In drafting the Cable Act, Congress agreed that protecting 
free speech rights over access channels requires that cable opera-
tors not interfere with access programming whether in response 
to governmental edict or on their own accord. Congress declared 
that "separat[ing] editorial control over a limited number of 
cable channels from the ownership of the cable system itself . . . 
is fundamental to the goal of providing subscribers with the di-
versity of information sources intended by the First Amend-
ment."261 To assure that cable systems "provide the widest pos-
sible diversity of information sources and services to the 
public,"262 the Cable Act explicitly bars cable operators from 
censoring or exercising any control over the content of access 
programming.263 Congress stated that such freedom was integral 
to the concept of the use of access channels. 264 Congress 
designed the Cable Act to prevent a recurrence of the situation 
where the cable operator had the power to limit the access 
programmer's first amendment rights. 266 To remove the need for 
censorship, Congress specifically provided that cable operators 
could not be found legally liable for the content of access pro-
gramming. 266 Thus, for access channels, the law now regards the 
role of the cable operator as similar to that of a telegraph or 
telephone company-simply the owner of the wires that the 
public will use for transmitting information: "With regard to the 
access requirement, cable operators act as . . . conduits. They 
do not exercise their editorial discretion over the programming 
"267 
programming on a channel set aside as a public forum, to which the programmer has a 
right of access by virtue of local, state or federal law, would impose a system of prior 
restraint in violation of the Freedman requirement."); accord Midwest Video Corp. v. 
FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
See generally supra text accompanying note 256 (describing the Freedman require-
ments). The FCC deleted its obscenity rules in 1985, as superseded by the Cable Act. 
Implementation, supra note 196, at 18,656. 
261. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEws at 4668. 
262. Cable Act § 601(4), 47 U.S.C. § 521(4). 
263. Sections 611(e) and 612(c)(2) prohibit cable operators from exercising editorial 
control over public and commercial access channels, respectively. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 
532(c)(2). 
264. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4684. 
265. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1057 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other 
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (describing the situation as one where "the cable operator 
[served as] both judge and jury, and subjected the cable user's First Amendment rights 
to decision by an unqualified private citizen"). 
266. Cable Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558. 
267. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 35, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4672. One peculiar bit of legislative drafting might appear to contradict 
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The Cable Act thus protects the operators from liability for 
access programming, and provides that operators may only act 
this image of cable operators as conduits for access programming. The Cable Act states: 
"Subject to section 624(d), a cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over 
any public, educational, or governmental use of channel capacity provided pursuant to 
this section." Cable Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (emphasis added). It might seem 
that § 624(d) would contain the exception to the ban on operator editorial control over 
access. Section 624(d), however, consists of two subsections, neither of which give the 
operator any editorial control. 
Section 624(d)(l) states that the Cable Act does not bar "a franchising authority and a 
cable operator from specifying, in a franchise or renewal thereof, that certain cable ser-
vices shall not be provided or shall be provided subject to conditions, if . . . obscene or 
... otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States." Cable Act 
§ 624(d)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(l) (emphasis added). Section 624(d)(2) requires cable 
operators to make lock boxes available to subscribers. See supra text accompanying 
notes 191-96. The phrase, "specifying, in a franchise ... that certain cable services shall 
not be provided," should not be interpreted to permit a franchising authority to require 
an operator to censor "obscene" access programs. Not only would such a requirement 
subject the operator to the stringent procedural demands imposed on governmentally 
authorized censors, see supra text accompanying notes 255-56, it would eliminate an im-
portant protection provided in the Cable Act for the cable operator-the provision that 
cable operators cannot be held liable by federal, state, or local government for any pro-
gramming, including obscenity, shown on access channels. Cable Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 558. Congress explained this provision by noting that the law "prohibits the operator's 
editorial control over all such channels." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 95, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. ConE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4732. Liability may still be imposed, 
however, on the producers of access programs and on anyone, including a cable operator, 
who "exercise[s) control over the content of programs." Id. Any exercise of power over 
access programming by an operator would thus remove the protection from liability cre-
ated by Congress. It is unlikely that Congress intended to contradict itself and expose 
cable operators to liability for access programming when it permitted "specifying in a 
franchise" that obscene programming would not be shown. See D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, 
supra note 137, § 6.04[5), at 6-39. 
The Cable Act prohibits all editorial control over access by the operator. See supra 
text accompanying notes 244-68. Section 624(d)(l), therefore, should not be read as per-
mitting a franchising authority to require that a cable operator exercise "editorial con-
trol" over access programming by deciding which programs meet the definition of "ob-
scene." Moreover, § 624(d)(l) can be given a far more plausible interpretation: a 
franchising authority may "specify" in the franchise agreement that programming that 
has previously been judicially determined to be "obscene" shall not be shown on the 
access channel. This would not place the cable operator in the prohibited position of 
censor. Rather, the operator would merely enforce a judicial determination that the pro-
gramming is obscene. 
Section 624(d)(l) can also be given "a literal reading"-permitting a franchise that 
"specifies" that obscene programming not be shown and thereby binding both signato-
ries, the franchising authority and the cable operator, to keep such programming off any 
channel under their editorial control. See D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, 
§ 6.04[5), at 6-39; see also Meyerson, supra note 201, at 602-03. 
A final, and not inconsistent, interpretation focuses on the other part of§ 624(d), sub-
section (d)(2), which requires operators to provide lock boxes. Section 624(d)(l) can be 
read to permit a franchise to "specify" that the "lock boxes," which the operator must 
provide, be capable of blocking out the access channels. See supra text accompanying 
notes 193-96. This would explain the seeming exception to the ban on operator editorial 
control over access programming, which stated that the ban was "[s]ubject to § 624(d)." 
Cable Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 53l(e). Under this interpretation, the only control a 
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as "conduits" for the provision of access programming.288 Cable 
operators, therefore, no longer have either a reason or the legal 
ability to prescreen access programming or exert any other influ-
ence over its content. 
b. Content control of access programming by the govern-
ment-As for governmental regulation of access programming, 
the Cable Act establishes different limits depending on whether 
a program appears on a commercial or public access channel. 
The Cable Act apparently gives local governments some control 
over the commercial access programming. Section 612(h) states 
that programming on these channels: 
shall not be provided, or shall be provided subject to con-
ditions, if such cable service in the judgment of the 
franchising authority is obscene or is in conflict with 
community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitu-
tion of the United States.269 
Although the statutory language, at first reading, may seem to 
give the franchising authority broad power to keep both obscene 
and indecent programming off the · commercial access channel, 
Congress has supplied its own limiting construction. The House 
Report makes clear that the regulatory power conferred by sec-
tion 612(h) is quite restricted: "[T]his subsection empowers 
franchising authorities to prohibit or condition the provision of 
cable services which are obscene or otherwise unprotected by the 
Constitution. "27° Congress apparently intended the extraneous 
statutory language, "lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent," to be 
modified by the phrase, "otherwise unprotected by the Constitu-
tion of the United States." Thus, until such time as the Supreme 
Court declares this category of speech "unprotected," the stat-
cable operator may exercise over access programming would be to ensure that those sub-
scribers who wished to avoid all "offensive" programming could use the lock boxes, re-
quired by§ 624(d), to keep "offensive" access, as well as other programming, out of their 
homes. The three suggested interpretations are consistent with one another, and together 
they may delimit the ability of franchising authority to turn the cable operator into a 
watchdog over access programming. 
268. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 35, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4672; see supra text accompanying notes 242-48. The only exception 
might be when there has already been a judicial determination of obscenity. See supra 
note 267. 
269. Cable Act § 612(h), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (emphasis added). 
270. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 55, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4692. Congress deemed such governmental power necessary because 
"leased access channels are not subject to the editorial control of the cable operator." Id. 
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• 
ute limits franchising authorities to the regulation of obscene 
commercial access programming. 
As for public access channels, the Cable Act prohibits local 
governments from regulating the content of this programming. 
Public access channels are available to the entire community, for 
use on a first-come, first-served, nondiscriminatory basis,271 and, 
by statutory definition, are "designated for public ... use."272 
Congress ref erred to public access channels as "the video 
equivalent of the speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to 
the printed leaflet."278 These channels constitute a facility that 
"the State has opened for use by the public as a place for ex-
pressive activity" and that therefore has the status of a govern-
mentally created public forum.21• The Supreme Court has held 
that freedom of speech is protected within such a forum. 2711 The 
Court has required that any governmental content-based regula-
tion be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest and 
contain all necessary procedural safeguards.276 
Although the Cable Act is silent on this issue, the absence of a 
public access section comparable to section. 612(h) suggests that 
Congress intended no governmental oversight for the public ac-
cess channels. Similarly, the House Report indicates that Con-
gress intended local governments to have editorial control over 
their own so-called government access channels, but not those 
channels designed for public use. 277 The Report states, "There is 
271. "Generally, public access is thought to be first-come first-served, with some 
modest efforts to assure continuity for some users." D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 
137, § 6.04[3][c) at 6-32; see also Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Chan-
nel Requirements Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 328 (1976) (detailing former FCC 
access requirements). 
272. Cable Act § 602(13)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 522(13)(A). 
273. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEws at 4667. 
274. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). This 
public forum is not one "created for a limited purpose." Id. at 46 n.7. The government 
has created it specifically to enable the members of a community to speak. It thus differs 
markedly from limited purpose public fora, such as a state university with an educa-
tional "mission," Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981), or a military base 
with a special need to protect "security." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985). 
275. E.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 (stating that a state university that accommo-
dates student meetings has created a forum for students and "has assumed an obligation 
to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms"). 
276. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (holding that when government creates a place 
for expressive activity by the public, the government is bound "by the same standards as 
apply in a traditional public forum"). See discussion at notes 255-58 for procedures re-
quired to regulate the content of speech in a public forum. 
277. Section 611 describes three types of access channels: public, educational, and 
governmental (PEG channels). Although the statute does not define these terms, public 
access channels were obviously meant for the public at large; the House Report stated 
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no limitation imposed on a franchising authority's or other gov-
ernmental entity's control over or use of channels set aside for 
governmental purposes. "278 Because this sentence immediately 
follows the Report's statement that section 611(e) bars the cable 
operator from all editorial control "of the use of the PEG [pub-
lic, educational and governmental] channels,"278 it can be in-
f erred that Congress intended the other access channels, espe-
cially public access, to be free of supervision by the government, 
as well as by the cable operator. 
c. Categorizing the entity that runs the access chan-
nel-Aside from the cable operator and the municipal govern-
ment, there is one other party who may feel the temptation to 
censor access programming: the entity charged with administer-
ing the public access channels. In any system of public access, 
some entity must, at minimum, schedule programs and make 
sure that the access programs are cablecast. More frequently, ac-
cess centers receive funding and equipment from the cable com-
pany or the municipal government's franchise fee,280 hire staffs 
for training community members in the use of the equipment, 
and publicize the use of the channel.281 
Certainly, the Cable Act permits some type of regulation of 
the access channel. 282 An access manager may decide to reserve 
some time slots for hour versus half-hour programs, or to set 
aside some days for series as opposed to onetime program-
that public access channels "provide groups and individuals who generally have not had 
access to the electronic media with the opportunity to become sources of information in 
the electronic marketplace of ideas." HR REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted 
in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4667. Congress intended the educational 
channels to bring "local schools into the home" and governmental access to show "the 
public local government at work." Id. The statute does not describe how these latter two 
types of channels are to be operated. 
278. Id. at 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4684 (emphasis 
added). 
279. Id. 
280. See Cable Act § 6ll(c), 47 U.S.C. § 531(c) (permitting franchising authorities to 
enforce franchise provisions requiring the cable operator to provide "services, facilities, 
or equipment"); § 622(g), 47 U.S.C. § 542(g) (exempting certain costs for access facilities 
from the 5% franchise fee ceiling); § 625(e), 47 U.s:c. § 545(e) (barring modification of 
franchise requirement for access "services"). 
281. "All [access] systems need funding, policy, staff, facilities, equipment, channels 
for cablecasting the productions, rules and guidelines, and a grievance procedure. Fairly 
administered, the result will be an effective public access system that is responsive to all 
citizens." Thomas, Municipally Operated Public Access: Another Model to Consider, 8 
COMMUNITY TELEVISION REV. 24, 24 (1985). 
282. Section 6ll(b) permits franchising authorities to devise "rules and procedures" 
for use of the access channels. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 
U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (stating that, in a governmentally created public forum, "[r]easonable 
time, place and manner regulations are permissible"). 
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ming.288 Similarly, the administrator can establish rules giving 
preference to community members284 and preventing any indi-
vidual or organization from monopolizing channel time. An ad-
ministrator may even impose some "content" regulation if, for 
example, a system has several access channels available and 
reserves one for use by senior citizens, one for children's pro-
gramming, and others for general use.2811 Such a division would 
encourage access use without preventing any individual from 
communicating at any given time to the public.286 
It is a different issue entirely, though, when the entity manag-
ing the access channel wants to censor the programming, place it 
in an unfavorable time slot, or ban it completely because an ad-
ministrator believes the program is obscene, indecent, or other-
wise "offensive." The characterization of the entity will then de-
termine the legality of such censorship. 
A tremendous variety of entities currently run access facilities 
across the country. These entities can be grouped into three 
main categories: (1) cable company-run access centers; (2) mu-
nicipally run centers, including public institutions such as public 
libraries and schools; and (3) not-for-profit management 
corporations. 287 
The first two categories create little difficulty for determining 
the limits of their regulatory power. When the cable company 
runs access,288 the cable operator obviously controls the access 
facility. The Cable Act prohibits the cable operator from exert-
283. D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, § 6.04 [3l[c) at 6-32; see supra note 
271. 
284. But see RVS Cablevision Corp., 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1133 (Cable TV Bur. 
1976) (striking down preference for local residents on an access channel as violative of 
the 1972 FCC rules mandating nondiscriminatory access). 
285. The original franchise for Dallas, providing 30 channels for access, had such a 
division. See Meyerson, supra note 201, at 588 n.269. 
286. With only one access channel, by contrast, the selection of.which topics could be 
discussed in "prime time" would create the equivalent of censorship: ·"To allow a govern-
ment the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that govern-
ment control over the search for political truth." Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980). 
287. See generally Buske, Status Report on Community Access Programming on 
Cable, in 3 THE CABLE/BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BooK 106-07 (M. Hollowell ed. 
1983); Taylor & Brand, Access: The Community Connection, in CABLE TV RENEWALS & 
REFRANCHISING 81-82 (J. Rice ed. 1983). 
288. In Dallas, for example, the cable company, Warner Amex Communications, is in 
charge of community access. Sanders, Dallas: Access is alive and well under Cable Com-
pany Management, 6 COMMUNITY TELEVISION REV. 15 (1983). Other cities where cable 
companies run the access facilities include East Lansing, Michigan; Encino, California; 
and Iowa City, Iowa. Buske, supra note 287, at 106. 
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ing any editorial control over access programming, 389 and this 
prohibition applies equally to the operator's employees who 
work at the access center. Similarly, the same constitutional lim-
itations that apply to the governmental franchising authority 
apply to any governmental entity that runs access. 290 Once 
again, discrimination based on content is prohibited.291 
The nonprofit corporations create a more difficult problem. To 
determine the limits of their ability to censor access program-
ming and to discriminate based on a program's content, one 
must first determine whether to treat such corporations as cable 
operators, governmental entities, or independent private parties. 
Both the cable operator and the governmental entity are barred 
from censorship,292 but a purely private entity would be free to 
exert editorial control, including the right to censor access 
programming. 
Although the Cable Act does not address the categorization of 
nonprofit corporations directly, guidance can be obtained by 
asking two related questions. First, would such censorship be 
consistent with the Cable Act? Certainly, when Congress de-
scribed public access as "the video equivalent of the speaker's 
soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet," it envi-
sioned a forum free from censorship.293 Congress intended liabil-
ity for constitutionally unprotected speech offered on an access 
channel to rest where it rests when the orator speaks from the 
soap box-solely on the speaker who violates the law. The sec-
ond question then becomes: in addition to the individual access 
programmer, is the not-for-profit corporation legally liable for 
the· programming on the access channels it manages? If so, the 
access center must have the ability to censor access program-
ming in order to protect itself; if not, it has no valid reason for 
censoring such programming. 
To answer this second question, one should look to section 
638, which covers the question of liability for access program-
289. See Cable Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e); supra text accompanying notes 263-
67. 
290. Raleigh, North Carolina, is an example of a city with a municipally operated 
public access system. Thomas, supra note 281, at 24. 
291. See supra text accompanying notes 271-79. Before a governmental entity can 
attempt to enforce valid obscenity laws by preventing the cablecasting of a particular 
access program or by previewing all access programming, all of the Freedman procedural 
requirements must be in place. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra text accompanying notes 261-79. 
293. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Coo& CONG. & 
AoMIN. NEWS at 4667. As a soapbox orator, one has "the absolute freedom to advocate 
one's own positions." FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984). 
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ming. That provision does not mention access organizations. 
Rather, it envisions a universe of access programming with only 
two species: "cable operators" and "cable programmers." This 
section exempts cable operators from liability for access pro-
gramming and places the liability on "cable programmers."29• 
The Cable Act itself does not define the term "cable program-
mer," but the House Report states that the term includes "all 
parties that exercise control over the content of programs, and 
would not only include program producers .... "29~ Thus, if an 
access center "exercises control of the content of programs," it 
would meet the definition of a "cable programmer" and become 
subject to liability for all access programming. An access center 
that does not exercise editorial control, therefore, would not 
qualify as a "cable programmer." Accordingly, that center, like 
the "cable operator," would avoid liability for the access pro-
gramming. Moreover, while access centers are obviously not 
cable companies, the two share some definitional features. The 
Cable Act contains a rather broad definition of "cable operator: 
"[T]he term 'cable operator' means any person or group of per-
sons . . . who otherwise controls or is responsible for, through 
any arrangement, the management and operation of such a cable 
system."296 Because the not-for-profit corporation is responsible 
for the management of at least a few of the channels of the 
"cable system," it could well fit this definition.297 
A reasonable statutory interpretation of the Cable Act, then, 
would be to treat the access organization, in its role of managing 
the access channel and studio, as a "cable operator" for two re-
lated sections: section 611(e), barring its editorial control of ac-
cess programming, and section 638, exempting it from liability 
for access programming. 
Furthermore, the Constitution may well mandate this inter-
pretation under the "state action" doctrine, insofar as it bars an 
access center from censoring access programs or discriminating 
based on content. 298 Although any state action analysis contains 
294. Cable Act§ 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558. 
295. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4732. 
296. Cable Act § 602(4), 47 U.S.C. § 522(4). 
297. This is not to suggest that an access center is a "cable operator" subject to other 
sections of the Cable Act (e.g. franchise fees). See Cable Act § 622, 47 U.S.C. § 542. 
Rather, because the Act forces a choice between categorizing an access center as a "cable 
operator" or "cable programmer," it must be recognized that the access center shares 
some features with the statutory definition of cable operator. 
298. "Because the [fourteenth amendment] is directed at the States, it can be vio-
lated only by conduct that may be fairly characterized as 'state action.' " Lugar v. Ed-
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a bit of uncertainty,299 it appears that not-for-profit corporations 
that manage public access facilities meet the criteria for state 
action. State or local governments create many of these corpora-
tions, including appointment of their original boards of direc-
tors, and these corporations continue to receive funding either 
directly from the municipal government's franchise fee or from 
the cable company acting under compulsion of the franchise 
agreement. 800 Such a corporation constitutes not simply "a heav-
ily regulated, privately owned utility,"801 but an actual govern-
mental entity.802 The contrast between governmental and pri-
vate action is illustrated by a comparison of "a privately owned 
and operated" utility that the law does not consider a state ac-
tor808 and a utility directed by a Board of Commissioners ap-
pointed by a City Council and subject to the local government's 
ultimate control. The Supreme Court ruled that this second type 
of utility was a state actor bound by the fourteenth 
amendment. so• 
A corporation created by the government, in which the gov-
ernment appointed its members and charged it with the duty of 
running the public access channel and facility,8011 is not "pri-
mondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). The state action doctrine recognizes "the 
essential dichotomy" between deprivation of "life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law" by the state and by "private conduct 'however discriminatory or wrongful' 
against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield." Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). 
299. "(V]iewed doctrinally, the state action cases are 'a conceptual disaster area.'" L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 18-1, at 1690 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Black, The 
Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: 'State Action,' Equal Protection, and Califor-
nia's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967)). 
300. See generally Johnson, Public Access and Local Government: An Uneasy Rela-
tionship, 8 COMMUNITY TELEVISION REV. 18 (1985): 
Local governments often incorporate the non-profit group and appoint their 
original board of directors (sometimes they continue to control appointments to 
the board for all time). Many local governments are responsible for the access 
corporation's budgetary oversight; it is fairly common for the local government 
to allocate a portion of the franchise fee to access. In some instances, the govern-
ment hires staff and is directly responsible for administering the use of the ac-
cess channel. 
Id. at 19. 
301. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358 (finding a privately owned and operated electric utility 
not a state actor). 
302. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 68 (1963) (holding threats by 
unpaid commission, appointed by governor and charged by law with investigating and 
recommending prosecution of obscene publications, "constituted acts of the State within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
303. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 346 (1974). 
304. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 4 (1978). 
305. See, e.g., Taylor & Brand, supra note 287, at 82 ("[A)n Access Management 
Corporation ... is a corporation set up by city ordinance to handle access. It is granted 
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vate," but governmental. Such an entity is "bound to dissemi-
nate all views. For, being an arm of the Government, it would be 
unable by reason of the First Amendment to 'abridge' some sec-
tors of thought in favor of others. "308 
Some organizations that manage access centers are not so ob-
viously public. For example, in Fayetteville, Arkansas, a consor-
tium of arts, social service, and community groups formed a 
nonprofit organization that negotiated a contract with the local 
cable company to manage the public access channel established 
in the franchise between the company and the city.307 The first 
amendment binds even such a "private" access manager, how-
ever, in the operation of the access channels and facilities. 808 
The access corporation presents a different question from 
whether a private party that receives government funding, such 
as a school or a nursing home, constitutes a "state actor" so as to 
have its personnel or medical decisions governed by the four-
teenth amendment.809 It is also distinct from the question of 
whether state action exists when a private electrical utility dis-
continues service to a customer or when a warehouseman utilizes 
a state law to resolve a "private" commercial dispute. 810 
Rather, a corporation managing public access facilities and 
channels must respect the first amendment rights of access users 
because, even if "private," the corporation manages a public fa-
cility. Public access channels are governmentally created, 
a portion of the franchise fee, and its operation and relationship with both the city and 
the cable operator is established by city ordinance."); Manley & Hartzog, Who Should 
Manage Access? Austin: Nonprofit managed access still going strong, 6 COMMUNITY TEL-
EVISION REV. 14, 18 (1983) (describing the Board of Trustees of the Boston Community 
Access Programming Foundation, which is responsible for managing public access, as 
"appointed by the city"). 
306. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 150 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
307. Manley & Hartzog, supra note 305, at 18. In Austin, Texas, Austin Community 
Television, originally an organization of student volunteers, operates under a contract 
with the city to manage access. Id. 
308. See D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, § 6.09 [1] at 6-88 to 6-89 n.11. 
Id. 
The protections in Freedman appear to be as applicable to cablecast material as 
to motion picture theaters, since the danger of the chilling effect of prior submis-
sions to a censorship board will be the same for both. It would also seem to 
apply to other bodies delegated censorship power by the state or the Cable Act, 
in particular those overseeing public access and commercial channels. 
The Freedman standards are discussed supra at text accompanying note 256. 
309. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 
(1982); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that a public de-
fender is not a state actor in representation of clients). 
310. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
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originating in the municipal government's franchise agreement 
and authorized by the federal Cable Act. 811 The channels and 
the "services, facilities or equipment" provided for their use812 
are public. When running this public facility, the access center 
acts as "the repository of state power."818 Significantly, the 
center has not received the power of an electronic editor, but the 
power of the "traffic officer."814 The center has been given the 
power to ensure that the public forum runs smoothly. 
This situation, therefore, presents more than a case of a pri-
vate party leasing public land for its own use. 8111 Congress ex-
pressly intended that the "[p]ublic access channels available 
under [ the Cable Act] would be available to all, poor and 
wealthy alike."816 The access channel is not "leased" for the use 
of the access management corporation. The corporation must 
run the channel for the "public ... use,"817 and this "use" in- _ 
eludes the exercise of the right of free speech by the members of 
a community. 818 
The significance of this dedication of the access channel for 
public discourse can be seen in a comparison with the cases re-
jecting a first amendment right for the public to communicate in 
a private shopping center.319 In holding that private shopping 
center owners could bar picketing and distribution of handbills 
on their private property, the Court concluded: "[T]here has 
311. Cable Act § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531. 
312. See Cable Act § 61l(c), 47 U.S.C. § 531(c). This does not necessarily mean that 
an access center is a "state actor" insofar as employee relations are concerned. Cf. 
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840 (finding no state action in the employment decisions of a 
private school that received most of its funding from the government). Rather, the access 
center is subject to constitutional requirements in its operation of the public's access 
channels, facilities, and equipment. 
313. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286 (1913). 
314. Cf. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (finding that the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 did not limit the FCC's responsibilities over broadcasting to "super-
vision of the traffic [on the airwaves]. It puts upon the Commission the burden of deter-
mining the composition of that traffic."). 
315. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding state 
action in racial discrimination practiced by private restaurant leasing public space and 
paying substantial funds for its use, because the State had "insinuated itself into a posi-
tion of interdependence" with the restaurant). 
316. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 36, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS. at 4673 (emphasis added). 
317. Cable Act § 611(b), 47 U.S.C. § 531(b). 
318. Congress stated that public access channels "provide groups and individuals ... 
with the opportunity to become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of 
ideas." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEws at 4667. 
319. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 
(1972). 
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been no such dedication of [petitioner's] privately owned and 
operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents 
to exercise therein the asserted First Amendment rights. "320 
Two critical differences distinguish the shopping center owner 
and the access management corporation. First, unlike the shop-
ping center, the Cable Act legally requires dedication of public 
access channels, services, facilities, and equipment to "public 
use" as a public forum. Second, even if "privately operated," the 
public access channels remain publicly, not privately, owned. 
Thus, in some ways, a finding of first amendment rights on 
the access channels appears clearer than the finding in Evans v. 
Newton321 that the fourteenth amendment governs a public 
park, turned over to private trustees. That park was located on 
private property and granted, in trust, to the city of Macon, 
Georgia, for use "as a 'park and pleasure ground' for white peo-
ple only."322 As the dissent in Evans argued: "Baconsfield had 
its origin not in any significant governmental action or on any 
public land but rather in the personal social philosophy of Sena-
tor Bacon and on property owned by him."323 By contrast, pub-
lic access channels and facilities have their origin both in the 
"significant public action" of the government franchise and in 
their dedication to public use created by federal law. 
In a state action analysis, the significance Congress has at-
tached to public access becomes especially relevant. A public 
function is more likely to be found for activities that Congress 
considers of special importance.824 Congress has given such spe-
320. Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 570; see also Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520. 
321. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). The Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. rejected an argument 
that Evans "establishes that the operation of a park for recreational purposes is an ex-
clusively public function. We doubt that [Evans] intended to establish any such broad 
doctrine in the teeth of the experience of several American entrepreneurs who amassed 
great fortunes by operating parks for recreational purposes." Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978). The Flagg Court added that Evans found state action be-
cause the change of ownership did not eliminate "the actual involvement of the city in 
the daily maintenance and care of the park." Id. Insofar as this analysis is limited to a 
statement that not all recreational parks involve state action, it is correct. There is, how-
ever, a fundamental difference between Disneyland, which charges an admission fee and 
is obviously a private park, and the park in Evans, which was found to be "municipal in 
nature." The latter was "open to every white person, there being no selective element 
other than race." Evans, 382 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added). The Evans Court stated that 
its finding of state action was "buttressed" by the fact that the park "serves the commu-
nity." Id. at 301-02. A finding that managing a public access channel is state action can 
also be buttressed by the channel's openness to all and its service to the community. 
322. Evans, 382 U.S. at 297. The city thus lacked one of the prime rights of property 
owners, the right to permit whomever they wanted to enter upon their land. 
323. Id. at 316-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
324. In explaining why a sale of another's property by a warehouseman was not a 
public function, the Court stated: "In construing the public-function doctrine in the elec-
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cial consideration to public access, emphasizing the critical pub-
lic function that public access was intended to perform: "Thus 
there can be no doubt that the purposes of access regulations 
serve a most significant and compelling governmental inter-
est-promotion of the basic underlying values of the First 
Amendment itself."3H 
Even though both promote first amendment values, the gov-
ernmental creation of a public forum on cable television access 
channels and the governmental licensing of broadcasters differ 
dramatically. In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 328 sev-
eral members of the Court discussed whether broadcasters con-
stituted state actors. Although the Court did not reach a deci-
sion on this question,327 the discussion of those finding no state 
action remains particularly relevant. 
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion found that, although 
each broadcaster acted as a "public trustee," the actions of 
broadcast licensees were not state action because such a conclu-
sion would be inconsistent with the broadcaster's "traditional 
journalistic role. "328 He then concluded: 
More profoundly, it would be anomalous for us to hold, 
in the name of promoting the constitutional guarantees 
of free expression, that the day-to-day editorial decisions 
of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of restraints 
urged by respondents. To do so in the name of the First 
Amendment would be a contradiction. Journalistic dis-
cretion would in many ways be lost to the rigid limita-
tions that the First Amendment imposes on government. 
Application of such standards to broadcast licensees 
would be antithetical to the very ideal, of vigorous, chal-
lenging debate on issues of public interest. 329 
tion context, the Court has given special consideration to the fact that Congress, in 42 
U.S.C. § 1971(a)(l), has made special provision to protect equal access to the ballot. No 
such congressional pronouncement speaks to the ordinary commercial transaction 
presented here." Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 158 n.7 (citations omitted). 
325. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 34, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & 
AoMIN. NEWS at 4671. 
326. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
327. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart found no state action. 
412 U.S. at 114-21. Justice Douglas found no state action, but stated that such decision 
was not necessary to the case. See id. at 148-51. Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell 
refrained from deciding the first amendment issue. Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 
see id. at 146-47 (White, J., concurring). Finally, Justices Brennan and Marshall found 
state action. Id. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
328. Id. at 116-17. 
329. Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added). 
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The very nature of the access channels dictates the opposite 
conclusion for those who manage the channels. There is no 
"journalistic discretion" involved in running a public access sys-
tem; each individual access programmer exercises "journalistic 
discretion." Congress itself recognized that "the very ideal of 
vigorous, challenging debate" requires that the public access to 
cable television be free from any gatekeeper. Quoting Judge 
Learned Hand, the House Report explained how public access 
furthered first amendment interests: 
The interest in diverse sources of information is ["]akin 
to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected 
by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right con-
clusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude 
of tongues, than any kind of authoritative selection. To 
many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked 
upon it our all.["]330 
The state action doctrine thus restricts the power of an entity 
that runs an access channel and managing access facilities. Such 
an entity, supervising channels and facilities that are dedicated 
by the government for public expression, is subject to the stric-
tures of the first amendment. 
Public access has the potential for providing an electronic 
voice for a multitude of tongues. Neither the government, the 
cable operator, nor the access manager should be permitted to 
exercise "authoritative selection" over what those voices say. 
CONCLUSION 
The promise of cable television lies in its ability to bring an 
unprecedented variety of programming into the American home. 
The technology that carries this diversity also offers the means 
for giving subscribers and parents the power over what program-
ming enters their home. Individual homes can be protected 
without silencing the speaker. 
The first amendment requires that any plan for censoring 
speech to protect those who want to keep it out of their homes 
must reflect the specific technology involved. 331 The legislative 
330. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4668 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (emphasis added), a{f'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). 
331. See supra text accompanying notes 40-96. 
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plan for regulating pornography on cable television, embodied in 
the Cable Act, fulfills this constitutional requirement. The stat-
ute protects the right not to see-to avoid "offensive" program-
ming-by requiring that the cable operator provide each sub-
scriber with the means to block out channels presenting such 
programming. 332 This protection does not interfere with the 
rights of programmers and willing viewers. If not obscene, and 
therefore protected by the first amendment, the program may be 
presented over a cable system, free from governmental con-
trol. 888 If the public access channel carries such a program, it 
may be shown free from governmental, cable operator, and ac-
cess center control. 33' The only power to censor resides with the 
individual programmer and the individual subscriber. 
The issue of pornography will always be a difficult one, involv-
ing essentially irreconcilable viewpoints. The new technology of 
cable television presents the possibility of accommodating these 
interests, with respect for the valid concerns of all sides. 
332. See supra text accompanying notes 156-74 & 191-96. 
333. See supra text accompanying notes 97-188 & 197-241. 
334. See supra text accompanying notes 242-330. 

